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German V-1 missile in terminal dive over London, 1944.
1
 
                                                          
1 “Science Photo Library,” accessed November 26, 2013, 
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INTRODUCTION 
I have been observing for the past two weeks the most ingenious and 
simplest contraption that has come to my attention during this War, and 
that is the German pilotless aircraft bomb. …What I should like to bring 
your attention to is the potentialities of this flying missile, …Its best 
qualification is that it can fly in any kind of weather, and is entirely 
expendable. …I am firmly of the opinion that we should in the United 
States complete some of these gadgets copying the present one as nearly 
as possible with American materials and controls which are already 
available. It is a job, however, for a clever sheet metal worker and not an 
airplane designer. …The thing cannot be jammed by any kind of radio 
impulse, and apparently the only way to get rid of it is to shoot it up or 
shoot it down, or destroy the launching bases or the points of manufacture. 
It is the best guided missile that has been produced, …I have watched 
these pesky things miss the ridge pole of the house in which I am living at 
all hours of the day and night in all kinds of weather, and it is my opinion, 
for what it may be worth, that every resource you direct should be applied 
to the manufacture of a similar unit with or without direct control, and get 
it into production at the earliest possible moment.
2
 
 
So wrote Hartley Rowe, Technical Adviser to General Dwight D. Eisenhower, on 
June 30, 1944, to Dr. Vannevar Bush, Director of the Office of Scientific Research and 
Development (OSRD) in Washington, D.C. An eminent industrial engineer serving in 
London with the National Defense Research Committee (NDRC), Rowe’s World War II 
vitae included direct involvement with the Manhattan Project (The United States’ 
clandestine development of the world’s first atomic bomb). No doubt voicing the 
opinions of many, Rowe’s communiqué is an integral part of the genesis of the JB-2 (Jet 
Bomb model number 2), America’s first operationally successful, mass-produced guided 
missile; a direct copy of the German V-1. From 1944 to 1953, this “ingenious and 
                                                          
2
 Hartley Rowe, Technical Advisor to General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Headquarters, United States 
Strategic Air Forces in Europe, Advisory Specialist Group, APO 633, to Vannevar Bush, Director, Office 
of Scientific Research and Development, June 30, 1944, Record Group 218, U.S. Army, Entry 343A, Army 
Missiles, Box 3, File “OSRD 1944,” National Archives and Records Administration, II, College Park, 
Maryland. Hereafter cited as RG 218, Entry 343A, NARA II. 
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simplest contraption” advanced from a weapon of jealous reprisal to a technological 
touchstone guiding future development of United States cruise missiles and drones.
3
 
The terms pilotless aircraft, aerial torpedo, flying bomb, assault drone, guided 
missile, cruise missile and ballistic missile are used often in missile nomenclature, and 
the following discussion of terms will be helpful in illuminating differences between 
them. A pilotless aircraft is a craft capable of sustaining aerodynamic flight (having 
wings for lift and moving surfaces for control) with a mechanical or electronic automatic 
system that eliminates the need for a human being aboard to provide control. In the 
twenty-first century, the terms UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) and drone have virtually 
replaced the term pilotless aircraft. Most present-day drone designs are used for 
reconnaissance in military, law enforcement, and civilian applications. An aerial 
torpedo, flying bomb or assault drone is a pilotless aircraft with an automatic control 
system and ordnance aboard that is designed to: 1) detonate upon impact of the entire 
craft with a desired target or, 2) fire armed projectiles to destroy a precise target (in the 
case of twenty-first century assault drones). Whereas a missile is “any object propelled to 
strike a distant target,” and includes a broad range of projectiles from a hand-thrown 
stone, arrow, bullet, or a single or multi-stage rocket, a guided missile is: 
an unmanned vehicle whose course may be altered in flight by a self-
contained mechanism controlled via a radio signal, built-in target seeking 
radar, inertial guidance, or (in the broadest sense) preset controls.
4
 
 
The following diagram presents my own “family tree” of missile development: 
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Piloted Aircraft 
(1903) 
Pilotless Aircraft 
(1915 – present) 
 
Missiles 
(prehistoric-present) 
 
Simple Projectiles 
(prehistoric – present) 
Examples:  
stones, arrows, bullets, 
artillery shells 
Ballistic Missiles 
(1942-present) 
rocket engine powered 
Examples: 
V-2, ICBM, Saturn V 
Flying Bomb/Aerial 
Torpedo/Assault Drone 
(1915-present) 
Examples: 
Kettering Bug, Larynx, XBQ, TDR 
 
Guided Missiles 
Phrase applied to all missiles 
with pre-set, automatic, or 
remote-controlled guidance 
systems 
Cruise Missile 
(1942-present) 
jet engine powered 
Examples: 
V-1, JB-2, Tomahawk 
 
Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle 
(aka Drone, 1991-present) 
jet engine or propeller powered 
Examples: 
Predator, Raven 
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Pilotless aircraft, aerial torpedoes, flying bombs, and assault drones are all guided 
missiles. The term cruise missile, is a later development and distinguishes those guided 
missiles that have the capability of aerodynamic flight (have wings, and control surfaces 
that may be altered during operation), are continuously propelled by an air-breathing 
engine (jet), and are constantly controlled automatically and/or remotely. Conversely, a 
ballistic missile is rocket powered (solid or liquid fuel, not air-breathing), not 
continuously guided (accuracy is based on a planned trajectory), cannot sustain 
aerodynamic flight, and in many cases leaves the atmosphere following launch and re-
enters the atmosphere on descent. The German V-2 rocket (also known as the A-4) of 
World War II is considered the first practical ballistic missile. The German V-1/ 
American JB-2 is the progenitor of all cruise missiles.
5
 
 
German V-1 cruise missile undergoing preparation for launch, 1944.
6
 
                                                          
5
 Ronald Huisken, The Origin of the Strategic Cruise Missile (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981), 3; 
“Wernher von Braun: Feature Articles,” accessed October 7, 2013, http://www.earthobservatory.nasa.gov. 
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German V-2 ballistic missile undergoing preparation for launch, 1944.
7
 
 
The United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) initiated ten jet-engine powered 
guided missile projects during World War II, numbered sequentially in order of approval 
by the War Department as JB-1 through JB-10. Only the JB-2, precisely copied from the 
German V-1, reached production. Air Force Technical Service Command cancelled the 
remaining JB efforts in the design phase, or judged those that reached prototype testing as 
failures.
8
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Hartley Rowe wrote to Vannevar Bush during the first wave of V-1 attacks on 
London that began in the overnight hours of June 12 and 13, 1944. German propaganda 
radio broadcasts began using the term “V-1” to describe the little pilotless aircraft on 
June 23, 1944. The “V” abbreviated vergeltungswaffe which means “retaliation weapon” 
or “reprisal weapon” and the number “1” indicated the first of many such threats that 
would be unleashed against England. Such retaliation in the form of the world’s first 
successful cruise missile rose in response to the Allied invasion of June 6 at Normandy. 
With the allied armies having successfully established a beachhead from which they 
would drive toward Paris, the German high command hoped the V-1 would force a re-
deployment of a significant portion of military resources away from supporting the 
invasion back to the defense of England. The V-1 did succeed in forcing a redistribution 
of defenses in the United Kingdom, but not in affecting support for the invasion of 
Fortress Europe.
9
 
The history of the JB-2, America’s first successful cruise missile, is not widely 
known, and it is this circumstance that led me to pursue a small jet-powered pilotless 
aircraft as the subject for this thesis. I am eager to present something fresh to the 
historical record, particularly for public consumption. Regardless of my knowledge of the 
history of aviation, and my archaeological survey and excavation fieldwork on several 
aircraft wreck sites, the JB-2 remained unknown to me until 2007. Having accepted an 
invitation to Eglin Air Force Base at Fort Walton Beach, Florida, to discuss the 
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 Zaloga, V-1 Flying Bomb, 9, 18; Bennett Archambault, Director, National Defense Research Committee, 
London Liaison Office, to Vannevar Bush, Director, Office of Scientific Research and Development, June 
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possibility of performing further archaeological testing on two former missile sites on 
Santa Rosa Island, I found myself carefully walking through white beach sand dunes 
strewn with the rusting remains of American “buzz bombs.” 
There are differences and similarities in the methods employed by historians and 
archaeologists, and this essay offers insight on how these disciplines may work closely 
together. With a boot in both camps, my graduate studies and most of my work 
experience are in public history, but I’ve managed to concurrently accumulate a 
significant amount of archaeological fieldwork. In general simplicity, historians concern 
themselves primarily with the written, visual, and oral record of the past, attempting to 
understand and interpret change. Maintaining uncomplicated definition mode, 
archaeologists concern themselves primarily with three-dimensional objects and 
landscape features of the past, above and below ground, attempting to understand and 
interpret change. Historians are limited in their pursuit to the era of recorded thought, 
activity and imagery, whereas archaeologists may examine cultural remains before 
humans recorded their lives (at least in ways we general understand in the present) and 
throughout millennia to the present day. Yet there are historians who study artifacts, 
structures, and landscapes, and archaeologists who conduct impressive archival research. 
One of the similarities in the methodologies of both disciplines is thorough research, 
documentary, in the field, or otherwise. The primary difference between historians and 
archaeologists lies on and in the dirt. Historians usually don’t dig it, or scrutinize its 
surface. Archaeologists search the ground visually, in shovel tests, and in controlled 
excavations for data in the form of artifacts and features. The work below is an example 
of historical research enhanced by a detailed archaeological surface reconnaissance.   
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JB-2 Missile Launch Sites (8Ok248 and 8Ok246), Santa Rosa Island.
10
 
                                                          
10
 “Google Earth,” accessed February 25, 2014, http://www.google.com/earth/, map text/graphics by Gary 
F. Quigg. 
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Following two visits to the cultural landscape on Santa Rosa Island, I accepted a 
contract with Prentice Thomas & Associates (PTA) through The International Group for 
Historic Aircraft Recovery (TIGHAR) to conduct archival research and archaeological 
fieldwork. I was specifically tasked with completing an assessment of significance and 
condition of surface artifacts at archaeological sites 8Ok246 and 8Ok248 (JB-2 missile 
launch sites) and submitting a report on my findings that might assist Eglin AFB in 
making better informed decisions regarding the management of these sites. Upon 
delivering my narrative to PTA in July 2012, I realized I used only a small portion of 
over one thousand pages of archival material. The end of my search for a thesis topic that 
combined my life-long interest in aviation with my education and work experience in 
public history and historic archaeology lay in the stacks before me. I found myself 
uniquely qualified to examine the cultural significance of the JB-2 program in a thesis 
informed directly by my own immersion in its history and field investigation of its 
material remains.
11
 
My work at the sites on Santa Rosa Island was limited in scope to the evaluation 
of the deteriorating missile remnants and allowed only for a cursory review of the 
historical significance of the JB-2, but it provided helpful insight for the development of 
this essay. The more traditional approach to a public history thesis relies solely on 
documentary evidence in the form of primary and secondary sources. My approach is 
somewhat unique for its inclusion of archaeological data, using material culture as an 
added body of historical evidence, to present an argument and conclusions enlightened by 
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 Gary F. Quigg, “Assessment of Significance for Archaeological Sites 8Ok246 and 8Ok248 (JB-2 Missile 
Launch Sites)” (work for hire report, The International Group for Historic Aircraft Recovery, Wilmington, 
DE, 2012), 1-29. This report is the source of all archaeological field observations on Santa Rosa Island in 
the following pages. 
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interdisciplinary study. Although the development of the JB-2 may be explained through 
the interpretation of the written record alone, this explanation is abstract. The term 
material culture refers to the way human beings ascribe meanings to the objects we 
make, beyond their utilitarian purposes, “The things we make reflect our beliefs about the 
world; the things around us affect the way that we understand the world.”12 Certainly the 
test site remnants of America’s first successful cruise missile exemplify the concerns of 
the government, and its citizenry, in the early Cold War period and their apprehension 
regarding global events. Employing material culture, examined through archaeological 
study, in an historical examination of the JB-2 program allows the reader a more tangible, 
complete conception. 
Material culture includes cultural landscapes, areas intentionally changed by 
humans, which also have meaning other than their practical function. The JB-2 sites on 
Santa Rosa Island are important not only for their historical association, but also for what 
they represent symbolically. The cultural meaning of these military installations lies in 
American values of the early Cold War era that motivated their creation. Such societal 
feelings, beliefs, and pressing needs, included fear of the spread of communism and 
renewed global conflict, a reliance upon proven armed forces for defense and 
preparedness, the preservation of self, and lifeways, in a threatening world, and a faith in 
new technologies to resolve concerns and sustain prosperity. The material culture of the 
JB-2 sites on Florida’s “Emerald Coast” is evocative of such values.13   
                                                          
12 Lance Winn, “So What is it? Material Culture Studies Unmasked,” University of Delaware Center for 
Material Culture Studies, accessed May 29, 2013, http://www.materialculture.udel.edu/resources.html. 
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 U.S. Department of the Interior, “What is Material Culture?” accessed March 30, 2014, 
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This work is both public history and public archaeology, as it presents 
information derived from both disciplines that will be disseminated world-wide online.  
Both history and archaeology conducted in and for the public are perhaps more 
accurately described as applied history/archaeology. The use of the word “applied” 
meaning the information gleaned from research within these disciplines is utilized outside 
academia for real-world issues. For example, the historical and archaeological research I 
have completed thus far on Santa Rosa Island produced information that is now being 
used by Eglin AFB to help guide the ongoing management of archaeological sites 
8Ok246 and 8Ok248 (JB-2 launch facilities) as cultural resources.
14
 
In two chapters, along with this introduction, a conclusion, and appendix, I 
examine the JB-2 missile program chronologically from its inception in 1944 to its 
demise in 1953. First, this thesis will provide a historic context from which the 
significance of JB-2 cultural remains may be recognized, thereby illuminating the untold 
story of the weapon. Second, the following pages explain the historical importance of the 
JB-2 to the development of modern missile technology, highlighting the missile’s role in 
World War II and the early Cold War period within the United States. Third, primarily in 
the conclusion and appendix, I will connect the history of this missile program with the 
present-day significance of the archaeological remains in Florida as cultural resources on 
the National Register of Historic Places (NR), linking “traditional” archival research with 
                                                          
14 “What is Public History?” National Council on Public History, accessed May 31, 2013, 
http://ncph.org/cms/what-is-public-history/; “Archaeology for the Public: Public Archaeology Is…”, 
Society for American Archaeology, accessed May 31, 2013, 
http://www.saa.org/publicftp/public/forArchaeologists/outreach_PAis.html . 
12 
 
archaeological investigations recently completed at former JB-2 launch sites on Eglin Air 
Force Base. 
The first chapter is divided into four sections that chronologically focus on the 
first three decades of cruise missile development in the United States and Europe (1915-
1945), presenting an overview of early twentieth century development of pilotless aircraft 
that highlights pivotal achievements in the design of flying bombs. The Evolution of the 
Cruise Missile by Kenneth P. Werrell and Near Miss: The Army Air Forces’ Guided 
Bomb Program in World War II by Donald J. Hanle both serve as competent histories of 
cruise missile development for the reader interested in a more complete technological 
application. These two secondary sources, along with numerous primary sources, proved 
the most useful tools in constructing Chapter I: “The Robot Bomb.” 
Chapter II: “Tests and Global Stress,” is divided into six sections as I follow JB-2 
development from the end of World War II to the cancellation of the program eight years 
later. I focus on the evolution of the JB-2/Loon as a test vehicle for the Air Force and 
Navy, framed within the major events of the early Cold War. Two of the secondary 
sources that allowed me to contextualize the JB-2 within world events, Dawning of the 
Cold War: The United States Quest for Order by Randall B. Woods and Howard Jones, 
and The Cold War: A New History by John Lewis Gaddis, will be of particular interest to 
those wishing a deeper examination into the socio-political matrix of the early Cold War 
than I could provide here.  
Examining physical evidence of the Cold War in Appendix: “National Register 
Eligibility Assessments,” I evaluate the surviving material remains (cultural resources) of 
13 
 
the JB-2 program on Santa Rosa Island for significance and eligibility as defined by the 
National Register. 
The National Register of Historic Places is the official list of the Nation's 
historic places worthy of preservation. Authorized by the National Historic 
Preservation Act of 1966, the National Park Service's National Register of 
Historic Places is part of a national program to coordinate and support 
public and private efforts to identify, evaluate, and protect America's 
historic and archeological resources.
15
 
 
The National Register usually requires listed resources be at least fifty years old, and 
employs four criteria to determine whether or not a building, structure, object, district, or 
site is eligible: 
Criterion A: Properties may be eligible for the National Register if they 
“are associated with events that have made significant contributions to the 
broad patterns of our history.”16 
 
Criterion B: Properties may be eligible for the National Register if they 
“are associated with the lives of persons significant in our past.”17  
 
Criterion C: Properties may be eligible for the National Register if they 
“embody the distinctive characteristics of a type, period, or method of 
construction, or that represent the work of a master, or that possess high 
artistic values, or that represent a significant and distinguishable entity 
whose components may lack individual distinction.”18 
 
Criterion D: Properties may be eligible for the National Register if they 
“have yielded, or may be likely to yield, information important in history 
or prehistory.”19 
 
The two JB-2 sites on Santa Rosa Island, 8Ok246 and 8Ok248, cannot convey 
their historic significance under criteria A, B, or C, as most of the material culture therein 
                                                          
15 “National Register of Historic Places,” accessed May 23, 2013, http://www.nps.gov/nr/. 
16
 U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, Interagency Resources Division, National 
Register Bulletin 15: How to Apply the National Register Criteria for Evaluation, Patrick W. Andruss and 
Rebecca H. Shrimpton (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990, revised 1991), 12. 
17
 Ibid., 14. 
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 Ibid., 17. 
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 Ibid., 21.  
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lacks structural integrity. Only the decomposed and fragmented carcasses of spent 
missiles, and deteriorating launch facilities, remain. However, as archaeological 
resources, I argue, under criterion D, that these locations have produced important 
historical data.  The surviving material remnants of the JB-2 program are significant 
cultural resources worthy of inclusion on the National Register of Historic Places. 
In preparation for writing the following pages, I conducted research at some of the 
finest repositories in the United States. I obtained original military reports, publications, 
correspondence, press clippings and photographs from the National Archives and 
Records Administration II (College Park, Maryland) as well as the Library of Congress 
and National Air and Space Museum in Washington, D.C. I found similar primary 
sources at the history offices and archives at three United States Air Force (USAF) bases, 
Eglin, Maxwell and Wright-Patterson.  
While no secondary sources focus exclusively on the JB-2, recent relevant 
publications of merit have dealt with the larger historiographical issues within which the 
story of this pivotal missile unfolds. The great appeal of this topic is its obscurity, and 
thus the opportunity to present original research. Other than a chapter, or less, in guided 
missile histories, USAF cultural resources publications, and a few small websites, the 
public remains largely unaware of the JB-2 and its historical significance. The status of 
this early cruise missile as an “unknown soldier” of late World War II and the early Cold 
War provides an exciting opportunity for interpretation in and for the public. With a lack 
of secondary sources addressing the history of the JB-2, this thesis cannot relate to nor 
lead off from existing literature. Only three such resources, The Rise of American 
Airpower: The Creation of Armageddon by Michael Sherry, The Evolution of the Cruise 
15 
 
Missile by Kenneth P. Werrell, and Near Miss: The Army Air Forces’ Guided Bomb 
Program in World War II by Donald J. Hanle, assist in answering my research questions 
that relate specifically to the historical significance of the JB-2. As such, I rely heavily on 
primary sources for the arguments of significance. The remaining secondary sources 
assist in providing an understanding of the social and political era in which the missile 
developed, and thereby help me answer how the JB-2 program was affected by Cold War 
events and related to cultural phenomena until its termination in 1953. My research 
questions neither build on the arguments within the following secondary sources nor 
refute them, as they present no arguments specific to the JB-2: Dawning of the Cold War: 
The United States Quest for Order by Randall B. Woods and Howard Jones, The Cold 
War: A New History by John Lewis Gaddis, Homeward Bound: American Families in the 
Cold War Era by Elaine Tyler May, The Culture of the Cold War by Stephen J. 
Whitfield, and Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture and the Cold War, 1945-1961 
by Walter L. Hixson. 
Specifically, the research questions addressed within this thesis include:  
 How was the JB-2 utilized by the United States during World War II and in the 
early Cold War period? 
 How was the JB-2 program important to developing United States missile 
technology? 
 
 How was the JB-2 program affected by the social climate and political matrix in 
the United States? 
 
 Why is the significance and interpretation of the JB-2 missile remnants and 
launch sites at Eglin AFB important? 
 
 Why is the JB-2 historically significant? 
16 
 
My research provides a historical and archaeological context for this thesis, in 
which I argue the JB-2 missile is historically significant as a unique example of the rapid 
duplication of enemy technology for both physical and psychological retaliation, as a 
crucial link in the chain of development for America’s cruise missile program, and for its 
role in early Cold War deterrence. Jet Bomb model number 2 (JB-2), America’s first 
operationally successful, mass produced cruise missile, developed as a direct copy of the 
German V-1, with slight variation in manufacture due to differences between German 
and American components, machinery and tooling. Continuing modifications of the JB-2 
during its service life led to improvements in performance, control, and accuracy. From 
1944 to 1953, the JB-2 transitioned from a weapon quickly prepared for wartime 
deployment to an essential test vehicle for the United States Army, Air Force and Navy 
while supporting the U.S. policy of containment during the early Cold War.  
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CHAPTER ONE: THE ROBOT BOMB (1915-1945) 
 
Early Development of the Cruise Missile 
 
The cruise missile concept ascended during World War I. The notion of a 
propelled missile formed centuries ago, when the Chinese first used such rocket-powered 
weaponry in the twelfth century. Missiles remained without in-flight guidance and long-
range capability, simply being aimed and fired, until 1915. Warplanes used over the 
Western Front required at least one pilot, and large bomber aircraft demanded an entire 
crew of trained personnel, to employ destructive powers. As World War I progressed, 
along with horrific losses of pilots and crew members, airmen on both sides of the 
conflict queried whether or not the same damage could be achieved with pilotless craft. 
Field commanders who voiced this developing hypothesis hoped for all-weather usage, 
realizing that while both artillery and piloted aircraft required good visibility for accurate 
targeting, a flying bomb could be preset with range and bearing to a target (and timed to 
engage it upon arrival) without any visual reference necessary. While European air forces 
attempted to answer the question, the United States began to address the problem as well, 
two years before declaring war on Germany.
20
  
Noted American inventors Peter C. Hewitt and Elmer A. Sperry undertook the 
first recorded practical efforts to create an aerial torpedo, or pilotless flying bomb, in a 
fruitful, self-funded collaboration begun in April 1915. Developing an automatic control 
system and testing it on two different aircraft, the pair felt the invention was ready for 
official review by the summer of 1916. Sperry wrote to the United States Army Signal 
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University Press, 1985), 7. 
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Corps in August but received no reply. Thus Sperry and Hewitt arranged a meeting with 
the Navy, and on September 12, 1916, a seaplane under automatic control took off with 
Sperry’s son Lawrence as pilot in command (if not in control) and Lieutenant T.W. 
Wilkinson Jr. as pilot observer. The aircraft held a set compass course, climbed to a 
preset altitude, flew the programmed distance and began a dive to impact from which 
pilot Sperry recovered control. Following a safe landing, Wilkinson prepared a report 
listing the advantages and liabilities of such a guided missile, which may be used to 
describe the pros and cons of such weapons produced in the next forty years. Admiring 
the missile’s longer range, the lieutenant wrote, “They are practically indestructible, 
unless a well-aimed shot disables (the) engine or control devices, and they cannot be 
driven off.” Wilkinson duly noted the expense of the weapon, complicated launching 
methodology, and dubious strategic value due to the craft’s inability to strike a specific 
point. With such imprecise targeting abilities, guided missiles of the time could only be 
used against large area targets such as cities.
21
 
While European powers, most notably Britain, worked on their own versions of 
“flying bombs” the U.S. Navy authorized two hundred thousand dollars for Sperry’s 
project two months after America entered World War I in 1917. One hundred flight tests 
began in September with Sperry automatic controls installed in five Curtiss N-9 
seaplanes. Navy pilots aboard the planes were in control of the take off, but then flew 
“hands off” to monitor the control system until it began its preset dive to the target area. 
However, unmanned airplanes under automatic control did not fare well. The Navy 
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persevered for five years, but cancelled the program in 1922 after repeated crashes, 
shrinking funds, and an overall lack of progress.
22
 
The United States Army, wishing to erase the chagrin of missing their original 
opportunity with Sperry, invited him to be a part of their own guided missile project in 
1918 under the direction of Charles F. Kettering (inventor of the automobile electric 
starter). Kettering surrounded himself with a stellar development team, including Sperry, 
Ford Motor Company’s chief engineer C.H. Willis, and the surviving Wright brother, 
Orville (Wilbur had died of typhoid fever in 1912). The “flying bomb” that resulted from 
this consortium officially debuted as the Liberty Eagle, but it became far more commonly 
known as the “Kettering Bug.” Developed to be cheaper and simpler, the pilotless biplane 
was less than one-fourth the size of the Navy’s full-scale aircraft. The designers focused 
on economy, wishing to avoid destruction of full-size airplanes, and realizing that 
missiles in good working order are non-renewable resources. Several of the features of 
the “Bug” became components of the V-1 (and its American copy, the JB-2) twenty-five 
years later. These elements included the use of a cart and track launching system, the 
exclusion of ailerons, and an impeller that turned in the wind during flight to advance a 
counter that measured distance. When the counter on the “Bug” reached the preset 
number, the spark to the engine was cut and the wings folded to place the aircraft into a 
dive to the target area. Testing in the summer and fall of 1918 near Dayton, Ohio, ended 
with mixed results, but inspired Major General George O. Squier, Chief Signal Officer (a 
position equal to today’s Air Force Commanding General), to inform the Chief of Staff 
that the new weapon, “marks an epoch in the evolution of artillery for war purposes, of 
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the first magnitude, and comparable, for instance, with the invention of gunpowder in the 
Fourteenth Century.”23 
Those witnessing the trials of the Kettering Bug included a young officer named 
Henry H. “Hap” Arnold, who learned to fly at the Wright brothers’ aviation school at 
Simms Station, Ohio. The Division of Military Aeronautics sent Arnold to France 
following the “flying bomb” tests to inform select officers of the Allies about the 
program’s results. Shortly after his arrival at the Western Front, the Armistice of 
November 11, 1918, ended the war. Arnold, who would rise to command the United 
States Army Air Force during World War II, became the strongest American proponent 
of guided missiles during the next three decades and the driving force behind the rapid 
development of the JB-2. Testing of the “Bug” continued after the war, with the last 
flights conducted at Carlstrom Field near Arcadia, Florida, in October 1919. Although the 
Army remained enthusiastic about the potential of the “flying bomb” there were far more 
failed launches than successes, leaving the concept unproven.
24
 
Development of guided missiles continued in both Britain and the United States 
through the 1920s, with the most significant technological advance coming through the 
development of radio-controlled flight.  The Royal Air Force (RAF) tested several 
aircraft with radio control in the 1920s, and developed an unmanned “flying bomb” 
called the Larynx in both mechanical and radio controlled versions. The Larynx tests 
proved relatively successful, with improvements in both range and accuracy, but perhaps 
the most promising realization for the future of guided missiles appeared in its ability to 
outrun contemporary fighter aircraft. The high cost of program development coupled with 
                                                          
23
 Ibid., 13-15. 
24
 Ibid., 15-17. 
21 
 
slow improvement led to the cancellation of the Larynx in 1936. However, the RAF 
found success in developing reliable radio-controlled missiles used as aerial targets for 
gunnery practice, and continued their production from the 1930s well into World War II. 
Stateside, both the Army and Navy experimented with radio-controlled aircraft from 
1920 to 1925 for both guided missile and aerial target missions. Mixed results and 
military budget cuts (most significantly during the worst years of the Great Depression) 
led to a freeze on further development until the mid-1930s.
25
 
Concerned about the extensive military expansions in Germany and Italy, as well 
as the Japanese invasion of China, Hap Arnold, now a brigadier general and assistant 
chief of the United States Army Air Corps, revived the army missile program in 1936. 
However, due to funding delays, Arnold was unable to get new test aircraft produced and 
flown until November 1941. Manufactured by General Motors and designated GM A-1, 
the new missile could fly at 200 miles per hour for up to 400 miles carrying a 500-pound 
bomb load. Available in both mechanical and radio-controlled versions, the unit launched 
from a cart and rail system. Technicians modified the last of these devices with altitude 
control and a powered catapult launching system, tested in March and April 1942 at Eglin 
Field, Florida. Though aerodynamically sound, the small payload and poor directional 
control evidenced in these tests halted further development following final testing at Lake 
Muroc, California, the next year. Two additional guided missile programs between 1943 
and 1945 also ended in failure. The XBQ series of twin engine radio-controlled missiles 
ended quickly after repeated crashes and exorbitant costs during the testing phase, and a 
program using radio-controlled war-weary bombers filled with explosives (Project 
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Aphrodite) closed following poor target accuracy and the vulnerability of large, slow-
moving solo bombers to anti-aircraft and enemy fighter planes.
26
 
The U.S. Navy, equally motivated by developing fascist militarism, re-started its 
missile initiative in 1935 with approval to develop a high-speed radio controlled target 
aircraft that began flight tests in 1937. The flying targets began appearing in the sights of 
naval gunners the following year. Discussion of radio-controlled aircraft for combat use 
began anew, with the term “assault drone” employed as a term for “flying bomb” or 
“guided missile.” In November of 1941 the Navy ordered one hundred new missiles 
specifically designed as assault drones, along with one hundred obsolete torpedo bombers 
converted to the same purpose. The attack on Pearl Harbor caused the withdrawal of the 
torpedo bombers from the drone program for piloted deployment in the Pacific. 
Successful tests of these drones in April of 1942, which employed the cutting-edge 
technology of television to extend the operator’s vision, ultimately resulted in an order of 
338 drones armed with television cameras and torpedoes designated TDNs or TDRs 
depending on their source of manufacture. TDRs were combat tested in the Pacific in 
September and October of 1944. Launched from the Sterling and Green Islands, twenty-
nine of forty-six TDRs reached their Japanese targets. Ironically the TDR development 
program had been officially cancelled September 8 due to resistance from naval aviators, 
its arrival late in the war when the U.S. had achieved complete air superiority, and the 
high expense in labor and materials with insignificant results. The Navy offered the entire 
program to the Army on October 25. General Arnold declined the offer, fully committed 
to the new JB-2 program which had just begun test launches two weeks earlier at Eglin 
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Field. Thus, the United States ultimately relied on German technology (in the form of an 
American copy of the V-1) for its first successful cruise missile.
27
 
Vengeance is Mein: The Development and Deployment of the V-1 
The development of a reliable jet engine served as the catalyst for the creation of 
a successful cruise missile, and Germany led the world in this technology through the 
interwar period while missile development efforts in the United States and Great Britain 
struggled. The 1919 Treaty of Versailles forbade Germany to have an air force, but 
clandestine development of aircraft under the auspices of a secret air force progressed 
rapidly in the 1920s and 30s. In 1928 Paul Schmidt, an engineer from Munich, began 
experimenting with the concept of the pulse-jet engine developed by Georges Marconnet 
of France in 1909. Schmidt’s experiments led to a 1931 patent, and modest government 
support for development in 1933. The following year Schmidt proposed a “flying bomb” 
powered by a pulse-jet, and in 1935 Schmidt received a contract to produce one. That 
year Hitler publicly renounced the disarmament provisions of the Versailles Treaty, and 
revealed to the world that Germany had an air force of eighteen thousand men with a 
budget larger than those of Britain and France combined.  Four years later Germany 
produced and tested the first jet powered aircraft, the Heinkel He-178-V1, which utilized 
a gas turbine jet (turbo-jet) unlike the pulse-jet. Schmidt’s pulse-jet powered pilotless 
bomber prototype also debuted in 1939 (not the later V-1 design), but the Luftwaffe 
denied further development citing the same problems all embryonic guided missiles faced 
at the time, cost, accuracy and range.  However, the Argus Company had been working 
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independently to develop a pulse-jet engine, and in 1940 the German Air Ministry teamed 
Schmidt with Argus.
28
  
The engine resulting from this union emerged from the workshops ingeniously 
simple and reliable with a good power-to-weight ratio, and less expensive to produce than 
turbo-jet engine designs. A pulse-jet consists of a long tube used as a combustion 
chamber into which a fuel and air mixture is forced in pulses and ignited. Such 
combustion is self-sustaining, as the shock waves from the initial combustion ignite 
subsequent pulses of the mixture. The explosion resulting from each pulse forces exhaust 
out of the chamber, but there must be a means of guiding the exhaust in the proper 
direction for controlled propulsion. To properly route the exhaust power, Schmidt created 
small spring steel shutters forced open by the intake of air, allowing the fuel mixture into 
the chamber, then forced closed by the combustion. The low pressure in the chamber 
following the explosion (combustion) in combination with the pressure of the incoming 
air forced the shutters open again to repeat the cycle and provide directed propulsion. 
Argus combined this shutter system with a stable fuel injection method. Though not fuel 
efficient, it ran on regular gasoline rather than more expensive high octane aviation fuel. 
The primary drawback of the engine appeared as vibration, caused by the combustion 
detonations which occurred forty-seven times per second. Such vibration would damage 
both the engine and airframe over time, but as each “flying bomb” launched would 
complete only a single flight of one half hour, such deficiencies remained acceptable. The 
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Argus Company, as an engine manufacturer, had no experience designing airframes. 
Accordingly, Luftwaffe leadership initiated a cooperative effort with the Fiesler 
Company in February 1942 that led to Fiesler engineer Robert Lusser creating a 
preliminary airframe design in April.
29
 
The German war effort faced an epiphany in early 1942 resulting from a number 
of developments that ultimately led to the creation of the V-1. With the conquest of 
France in 1940, the range necessary for a guided missile attack on London significantly 
decreased. Luftwaffe losses in the failed attempt to defeat England with air power alone 
during the Battle of Britain and the continuing air war on the Russian front shocked the 
German Air Ministry, greatly increasing the value of a “flying bomb.” Hitler, infuriated 
by British bombing attacks on German cities, demanded suitable retaliation. In June 
Argus and Fiesler, working with the Askania Company to provide a guidance system, 
were given official approval by the German Air Force to move forward with the 
development of the Fiesler Fi-103, later known as the V-1. Like Great Britain and the 
United States, Germany tested radio control technology for guided missiles, but these 
signals could be easily jammed. Therefore, the Fi-103 was fitted with a mechanical 
inertial guidance system based on gyroscopes; a derivative of the same system developed 
by Sperry in 1915.
30
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V-1 Missile (Fi-103/FZG-76)
31
 
 
Upon the completion of the first Fi-103 on August 30, 1942, testing commenced 
in September. The Luftwaffe gave the new missile the code name Kirschkern (Cherry 
Stone) and later provided another cover name, FZG-76 (Flakzielgerat 76). The Air 
Ministry created the latter moniker to disguise the weapon as a target drone for use in 
anti-aircraft gunnery practice. Flight tests took place at the Luftwaffe Test Establishment 
at Peenemünde on the Baltic Coast near the test site for the A-4 ballistic missile (later to 
be better known as the V-2). A four-engine Fw-200 Condor bomber dropped the first Fi-
103 in an unpowered flight on October 28, and the first powered flight from an aerial 
launch was on December 10. The Argus-Schmidt pulse-jet engine did not have enough 
power to launch the Fi-103 alone from the ground. The first surface launch occurred at 
Peenemünde on December 24 using a rocket-powered cart on a rail track. A catapult 
powered by hydrogen peroxide and sodium permanganate soon replaced the less efficient 
rocket/cart method, and remained the sole ground launch system throughout the V-1 
program. Testing continued into 1943, with eighty-four total launches by the end of July. 
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While the aerial launches proved reliable, only twenty-eight of the sixty-eight ground 
launches achieved success by this point.
32
  
The British began conducting reconnaissance flights over Peenemünde in January 
1943, and the program to identify and destroy the German secret missile program known 
as Operation Crossbow commenced the following August. The first RAF bomber attack 
on Peenemünde on the night of August 17-18 set back the V-2 ballistic missile program 
several weeks, but left the V-1 program virtually unscathed. A successful Fi-103 aerial 
launch on August 22 resulted in a major detriment to the program when the missile crash 
landed on Bornholm Island. The Danish Resistance took photographs of the wreckage 
and quickly forwarded them to British Intelligence. Further aerial reconnaissance and 
reports from the French Underground confirmed the construction of V-1 launch ramps 
aimed toward London in Normandy and the Pas de Calais. Bombing raids on these sites 
and Peenemünde at night from the RAF and by day from the USAAF continued for one 
year. Constructed of heavily reinforced concrete, with walls as thick as twenty feet in 
some areas, the German missile sites presented a tough target for allied air crews to 
destroy.
33
  
Following dubious results from the first six months of Crossbow missions, the 
armament division at Eglin Field, Florida, received orders to find the best method to 
attack V-1 launch sites, in one of the most notable logistical feats of the war stateside. 
Commanding General of the USAAF Proving Ground at Eglin, Grandison Gardner, 
received a phone call from Chief of Staff General “Hap” Arnold on January 25, 1944: 
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Gran, I can’t tell you over the telephone what I’m talking about, but I hope 
you will know. …I want you to build one, study it and decide what is the 
best way to destroy it. I want it done in days and not weeks. Did you hear? 
Days and not weeks, and it will take a helluva lot of concrete.
34
 
 
Details from the French Underground, aerial reconnaissance photos, and sketches by 
British Intelligence provided construction specifications. Gardner directed the purchase 
of all available brick, lumber, concrete and steel within hundreds of miles of Eglin to 
build the mock-up V-1 launch sites, completed after twelve days of around-the-clock 
construction during February and March. As soon as the concrete dried fighters and 
bombers flying at different altitudes attacked the sites employing various tactics. On 
February 19 British Air Marshals Norman Bottomley and Frank Inglis along with 
General Arnold watched one of the demonstrations at Eglin. The March 1 final report 
from Gardner showed that low level attacks by fighter-bombers equaled the effectiveness 
of medium or high level bombers with less risk of loss and at a lower expense. Much to 
the surprise of the USAAF, the British refused to accept the results and continued to 
insist on using heavy bombers at high altitudes. After acrimonius debate between U.S. 
and British air chiefs, General Dwight Eisenhower chose to acquiesce to RAF demands. 
The Crossbow bombing campaign resulted in 122,133 tons of explosives dropped during 
68,913 sorties flown by the RAF and USAAF between August of 1943 and March of 
1945. Most of the larger, permanent V-1 launch sites were ruined by the bombardment, 
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but smaller sites escaped destruction. During the height of Crossbow operations from 
December 1943 to June 1944 the Allies lost 771 crewmen in 154 aircraft.
35
 
The Germans reacted to the bombardment of the V-1 sites by building more 
mobile facilities that could be easily constructed and concealed, while continuing to 
improve the missile in test flights until May 1944, the month before scheduled launches 
against England. On May 16 Hitler ordered Operation Eisbar, the missile attack on 
London, to begin by mid June. Approximately half of the 150 launch sites achieved 
readiness for action by the D-Day invasion on June 6, 1944. Hitler pushed for the start of 
the V-1 campaign as a reprisal, with plans to launch up to 500 missiles. However, due to 
the disruption of supply lines from allied bombing, only nineteen V-1s headed for 
England on the overnight of June 12/13. Fifteen of these devices failed before reaching 
England, with four hitting the greater London area killing six civilians. Lord Cherwell 
(Frederick Lindemann), Winston Churchill’s trusted personal scientific advisor, 
remarked, “The lion hath groaned and given forth a mouse.”36  
The “flying bomb” about to rain death and destruction along the Thames, for all 
its heinous intent, consisted of a simple, inexpensive, and ingenious technological 
advance. Once placed on the launch ramp, crewmen primed the pulse-jet motor by 
opening the fuel and air valves, and connecting an air compressor to the intake. The 
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mixture ignited when the single Bosch spark plug in the top of the combustion chamber 
received electrical current. With the engine running, the catapult accelerated the missile 
to at least two hundred miles per hour to establish enough lift and forward inertia for the 
pulse-jet to thrust itself forward from there. Two spherical compressed air bottles behind 
the fuel tank (which the main wing spar passed through) powered both the gyroscopic 
autopilot controlling the rudder and elevator (holding a course determined by a magnetic 
compass in the nose) and pressurized the fuel lines to inject an atomized mixture to the 
engine. At the tip of the nose a small propeller (known as an impeller), attached to a 
threaded rod running back through the missile, armed the warhead in flight and (after the 
preset number of turns) fired detonators that severed the pneumatic hoses leading to the 
rudder and elevator. Simultaneously the impeller rod created an electrical impulse that 
detonated two explosive charges at the rear of the aircraft which deployed two spoilers 
(small metal flaps) underneath the horizontal stabilizer just forward of the elevator. The 
spoilers put the V-1 into a dive over the target, and the warhead (nearly one ton of 
amatol) exploded upon impact.
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V-1 Cutaway View
38
 
Table 1.                 Specifications for the V-1 (Fi-103A-1/FZG-76) 
Overall Length: 25 feet, 4 inches. 
Fuselage Length: 21 feet, 10 inches (engine extends past the rear of the fuselage). 
Fuselage Diameter: 2 feet, 8 inches. 
Wingspan: 17 feet, 6 inches. 
Launch Weight: 4,858 pounds. 
Fuel: 160 U.S. gallons. 
Warhead: 1,870 pounds Amatol high explosive with redundant impact fuses. 
Guidance: Askania pre-set autopilot with gyro inertial platform/magnetic compass. 
Engine: Argus-Schmidt 109-014 pulse-jet. 
Maximum Cruise: 415 miles per hour at 4,500 feet. 
Maximum Range: 130 miles. 
Accuracy: Circular error probability of 8 miles. 
                                                          
38 Zaloga, V-1 Flying Bomb, 29. Both the cutaway view and table of specifications are from Zaloga. 
32 
 
The unforgettable sound of the V-1 resonated from the Argus-Schmidt pulse-jet 
engine, and the new terror weapon caused a rising panic in London as the attacks 
increased. Londoners ascribed a number of names to the menacing missile, including 
Doodlebug, Hellhound, Junebug, robot bomb, flying bomb, and a host of 
unmentionables. Yet, the term “buzz bomb” became most prevalent when describing the 
V-1, derived from its distinct engine rumble. The second attack on June 15/16 began as 
244 missiles launched with 144 reaching the English coast, resulting in 73 falling on 
London and 53 on the Port of Southampton. Germany launched over five thousand V-1s 
by July 22, 1944, causing an exodus from London both officially and unofficially. A 
government program provided for the relocation of 360,000 women, children, elderly, 
and disabled that summer. Hitler rejoiced at the press accounts of the V-1’s physical and 
psychological impact on the city, and ordered the Luftwaffe to expand the effort. Attacks 
peaked on August 3 with 316 missiles launched, 220 of which hit London.
39
    
The continuing Allied air attacks on V-1 sites and the British and American 
ground forces advancing through France slowed the missile launch rate, and forced a 
German withdrawal to the East and to the air.  The last V-1 launched from France flew 
toward England on September 1, and all program personnel relocated to new launch sites 
in Belgium and The Netherlands where ground operations continued. V-1s also launched 
in the air from Heinkel He-111 bombers. The air launches began on July 9, 1944, and 
ended January 14, 1945, accounting for 1,776 missiles fired at London, Southampton, 
Gloucester and Manchester in England as well as Paris. The air launch campaign proved 
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particularly costly for the Luftwaffe. For the 388 V-1s that impacted England from He-
111s, RAF fighter aircraft shot down 77 bombers.
40
 
Not all V-1s carried deadly explosives alone. A few were also fitted with a hole 
near the wing that ejected propaganda leaflets when the target dive began. Some had a 
tube extending out beneath the tail that spewed such papers upon impact. Various kinds 
of leaflets included disturbing photos of German civilians killed in Allied bombing 
attacks, fabricated letters from P.O.W.s expressing the humanity of their German captors, 
newsletters proclaiming to tell the “real story” of Allied losses withheld from the British 
and American press by London and Washington, and warnings of new secret weapons to 
come. Some leaflets simply displayed the message, “V1” in bold red letters. The German 
propaganda ministry believed simply the name of the flying bomb would be enough to 
traumatize its intended victims.
41
 
During the first weeks of the V-1 “Robot Blitz” in June 1944, the Allies 
temporarily believed at least some of the guided missiles had the capability to find 
precise targets, and the barrage grew so intense that sweeping defensive measures were 
taken. A V-1 struck Eisenhower’s headquarters, and one of the most dramatic attacks hit 
the Guard’s Chapel at Wellington Barracks near Buckingham Palace. The explosion at 
the chapel occurred at 11:20 a.m. on Sunday morning June 18, and killed 121 
worshippers. On that very Sunday, Eisenhower (deep in the throes of directing the 
Normandy invasion) made countermeasures to the V-1 attacks priority over all other 
military needs except those urgently required by the ground war. Numerous fighter plane 
                                                          
40
 Ibid., 21-23. 
41
 Reginald George Auckland, V.1 Propaganda Leaflets, 1944-45 (Leeds, UK: Psywar Society, 1990), 1-3, 
32, 67-69. 
34 
 
squadrons intercepted the flying bombs, using the fastest types available (The USAAF 
Mustang and RAF Spitfire, Tempest and the Allies’ first jet fighter the Meteor) to catch 
up to the little buzz bombs that could reach four hundred miles per hour. Established 
fighter tactics did not work well against a V-1, as approaching at close range from behind 
the missile and firing would result in an explosion taking out the attacking fighter plane 
as well. One successful, though hazardous, tactic against the V-1 required a pilot to fly 
alongside it and slip one of the fighter’s wings under a missile wing and flip it over. This 
disruption tumbled the gyroscope guidance system in the missile, causing it to crash. In a 
matter of days the British Army’s Anti-Aircraft Command completed a massive 
redeployment of anti-aircraft guns from just south of London to the channel coastline in 
hopes of destroying the missiles well before they reached urban centers. The final line of 
defense was two thousand barrage balloons outside London, but some of the V-1s 
contained blades just inside the leading edge of their wings designed to cut balloon 
cables. These defenses downed just over half of all V-1s that reached England.
42
 
The German Air Ministry produced 30,257 V-1s (many by slave labor), and the 
Luftwaffe launched approximately 20,000 between June 12, 1944, and March 29, 1945. 
Despite a twenty percent launch failure rate from ramp explosions, premature crashes or 
wandering off course, over ten thousand civilians died in buzz bomb attacks on England, 
France and Belgium with three times as many wounded. Impacting in large cities, the 
missile’s target circumference allowed it to kill indiscriminately. The V-1 exemplified the 
“fire and forget” weapon, an aerial torpedo that could not be turned back. Once launched 
it flew until it crashed prematurely, exploded on target, or was destroyed by defenses. 
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With its high speed, low altitude approach (usually between 2,000 to 4,000 feet), no pilot 
to be injured or killed, and few vulnerable parts, it presented a difficult target. The buzz 
bomb could be launched at any time of day in any weather condition. It could easily be 
deployed in massive numbers because it was built of cheap, low carbon sheet steel 
instead of aircraft aluminum (some had wooden wings) and thus did not make use of 
precious wartime production materials. Yet this first generation cruise missile had a 
number of disadvantages. Poor accuracy limited its targets to large cities, thus it 
succeeded predominantly as a psychological terror weapon used against civilians rather 
than as a threat to military targets. Though fast and difficult to bring down, it flew a 
constant course and speed without the ability to evade threats. The V-1 required a 
catapult system on a long ramp to launch. These ramps were not mobile, and therefore 
vulnerable to attack. Further, the V-1 had a small warhead relative to the amount of 
explosives a bomber could employ. Despite its limitations, the Fi-103 guided missile 
represented a remarkable economic, technical achievement that would soon re-energize a 
sluggish U.S. missile program. American missileers soon faced the same advantages and 
limitations with the buzz bomb in their efforts to test and improve the new weapon.
43
 
Every Available Resource: Design, Development and Production of the JB-2 
As much as the Allies publicly cursed the V-1 as an unconscionable terror 
weapon employed by a madman, ironically, they privately praised its performance and 
deeply desired one of their own. Rather than waste development time fabricating a new 
missile design, the United States created “Chinese copies,” in the popular slang of the 
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era, of the V-1. Fortunately for the Allies, some of the V-1 missiles launched at England 
landed harmlessly, and by July a few unexploded V-1s went stateside to be duplicated. 
America’s first successful cruise missile, the JB-2, arose simply as a direct copy of a Nazi 
terror weapon. Great Britain and the United States viewed a V-1 launched in support of 
fascism and racism as deplorable, and, paradoxically, a JB-2 propelled in the cause of 
freedom and democracy as admirable. Terror, however, would remain consistent in those 
underneath the flying bomb, regardless of their cultural beliefs or politics.
44
 
Just over one ton of V-1 parts, salvaged from largely intact missiles that failed to 
dive and detonate as calibrated, arrived at Wright Field in Dayton, Ohio, on the evening 
of July 13, 1944, aboard a C-47 Skytrain piloted by Lieutenant Tom Wigglesworth. Dr. 
Stanley P. Franckel, a technical advisor to General Eisenhower in London (and another 
member of the Manhattan Project), escorted the precious cargo and carried with him 
construction plans to reverse engineer a duplicate copy of the V-1. The Air Technical 
Service Command at Wright Field began building thirteen copies of the flying bomb, 
which they called the JB-2 (Jet Bomb model number 2); the JB-1 designation having 
been assigned to a missile under development by Northrop Corporation that was later re-
designed as the JB-10. Three weeks later engineers completed a replica of the pulse-jet 
engine, using both German and American components, and successfully test fired it on 
August 1 before placing it in the twenty-foot diameter wind tunnel for aerodynamic 
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evaluation during the remainder of the month. Meanwhile the USAAF contracted with 
Ford Motor Company (pulse-jet engines), Republic Aircraft (airframes), Jack & Heintz 
(autopilot control systems), and Alloy Products (air tanks) to produce one thousand JB-
2s. A V-1 site had not yet been captured, so the Army Air Force was uncertain as to what 
launch system to require. Soon program officials settled on a rocket-propelled launch cart 
on a ramp to accelerate the JB-2s to speeds above one hundred fifty miles per hour. This 
system allowed the pulse-jet engine (too weak to power take off alone) to sustain an 
airspeed sufficient for lift and forward thrust. Northrop Aviation won the contract for the 
carts and Monsanto for the rockets, known as RATOs for Rocket Assisted Take Off (in 
later decades more commonly referred to as JATOs for Jet Assisted Take Off, even 
though none of the secondary power sources used to launch the JB-2s, or similar craft, 
consisted of jet engines).
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It is important to note the expediency, efficiency, and economy with which the 
United States developed its first successful cruise missile, copying German technology, 
in comparison to the immense effort expended under the ultra-secret Manhattan Project, 
in order to create the world’s first atomic bomb. Begun in 1939, America’s quest for a 
nuclear weapon required six years of toilsome effort, 125,000 workers (including the 
country’s leading scientists) at multiple sites, and over two billion dollars. In three 
months, Project MX-544 (the JB-2) arose from a collection of dysfunctional V-1 missiles 
to dozens of operational JB-2s ready for test launch, involving less than a thousand 
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workers and military personnel combined, for less than $10,000 per missile. There is little 
comparison between the daunting task of creating the original nuclear bomb and copying 
the latest missile technology. Quite simply, missiles existed as known, and predictable, 
vehicles in 1944-45; atomic explosions did not and, therefore, remained unknown and 
unpredictable. The Manhattan Project resulted in a new invention that ushered the world 
into the nuclear age. Whereas the battle-proven engineering within the initial version of 
the JB-2 had existed for two years, and, though the innovation it embodied was indeed 
significant, the missile relied on much of the basic mechanical methodology developed 
twenty-five years before in the “Kettering Bug.” Still, both weapons would change the 
very nature of modern warfare wherein enemies destroyed one another from great 
distances. Nuclear weapons have existed predominantly, thus far, as a proven threat for 
mass, if not global, destruction, while the cruise missile, though capable of carrying a 
nuclear warhead, and its progeny (the modern assault drone) became the oft-employed 
“surgical strike” alternative using conventional explosives.46  
Eglin Field near Fort Walton Beach, Florida, served as the initial site for JB-2 
trials. Eglin, as the Army Air Force’s weapons testing ground since 1941, had carried out 
the most recent U.S. missile trials in 1942. With test ranges over a large uninhabited land 
area and within the adjacent Gulf of Mexico, Eglin provided an ideal proving ground for 
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fledgling air weapon technology. The JB-2, with its jet speed, less than perfect guidance 
system, large target radius and volatility, needed lots of room for things to go wrong.
47
 
During the late summer and early fall of 1944 personnel at Eglin Field procured 
private land near the western edge of Walton County and quickly began construction of 
Range 64, the JB-2’s first test facility. Proving Ground Command chose the land for its 
remote location, large sand dunes for earthen launch ramps, level areas for operational 
facilities, and its uninhabited gulf shoreline. The War Department leased the property 
from owners John and Dorothy Coffeen for the duration of hostilities. Range 64 became 
America’s first dedicated guided missile installation, and as such remained a work in 
progress throughout its use. A self-sufficient base of operations, the area included missile 
launching, storage and maintenance facilities as well as housing quarters and a fully 
provisioned mess hall.  In addition to Proving Ground Command officers and enlisted 
men, liaison officers from the Engineering Corps and U.S. Navy, as well as civilian 
manufacturer representatives, pushed the total population of the little base up to 200. 
Range 64 grew so overcrowded that an additional 300 men assigned to JB-2 Training 
Unit, Squadron “P” had to be located one and one half miles east of Range 64, “where 
equipment was adapted to field conditions and assembly and launching operations were 
practiced in preparation for an overseas assignment.”48 
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Located between Fort Walton and Destin, Range 64 extended two and one-half 
miles by one mile in area. Over the course of testing operations between October of 1944 
and November of 1945, the Army Air Force constructed nine launch ramps, but no more 
than four could be operated at the same time due to space limitations.
49
  
The cost of construction for housing, supporting structures, and launch sites 
totaled $157,800. In addition to the mess hall, post office, and housing units, these 
physical facilities included: shops for the assembly and adjustment of JB-1, JB-2 and JB-
10 missiles, an instrument shop, a machine shop, a welding shop, a carpenter shop, three 
observation towers, two concrete bunkers for personnel protection during launches, two 
Shoran ground radar sites (for plotting impact points), and one SC-584 radar site (for 
plotting course, altitude, speed and range of missiles), as well as four radio sites (for 
directional finding plotting of each missile course). Additional recording equipment 
included photographic cameras, a ballistic camera, 16mm and 35mm motion picture 
cameras, a recording theodolite, a telemetry system, aerial cameras aboard chase planes 
and a U.S. Navy blimp, and a transit. In addition to the water range stretching outward 
from the beach 150 miles to the south, JB-2 tests also utilized a 4-square-mile land range 
wherein wingless missiles would be dropped from a B-17 bomber.
50
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The first launch of a JB-2 occurred on October 12, 1944, at Range 64. Arriving 
partially dismantled in customized wooden shipping crates, a test missile received final 
assembly in the maintenance shops where technicians attached the engine and wings. 
Shortly before launching, the ground crew towed the missile to one of two special 
concrete semi-circular compass swing bases in designated areas designed with no ferrous 
metal, where the magnetic compass and gyro guidance mechanism could be preset 
without any magnetic interference. With the range and bearing set, personnel towed the 
missile to the ramp base where a crane lifted the two-ton flying bomb onto the launch 
cart. The Ford PJ31 pulse-jet engine roared to life when atomized gasoline injected by an 
air compressor ignited from the single spark plug in the top of the engine casing. Launch 
personnel took cover in the nearby concrete bunker or behind temporary sand bag 
revetments. The operator at the control panel fired the missile electronically engaging a 
switch in the bunker that sent current to ignite the four RATO boosters at the rear of the 
launch cart. During the first launch on October 12 the JB-2 rapidly accelerated down the 
launch ramp and climbed away as the launch cart fell to the sand beneath it. Soon the 
missile began a shallow descent that lasted for two miles before it ended in the Gulf 
waters. Proving Ground Command considered the forty-second flight a successful first 
effort, as the missile launched properly, separated safely from the launch cart, and flew
42 
 
on course briefly, but understood much work was ahead to improve range, accuracy and 
reliability.
51
 
 
JB-2 on 500-foot, six-degree inclined ramp at Range 64, c.1944.
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As tests continued with four additional JB-2 launches in October and six during 
November, Range 64 personnel saw more failures than successes. Only three of the first 
eight missiles became airborne. Shadowing each missile, a chase plane, charged with 
aerial photography, could, if necessary, destroy the buzz bomb if it strayed too far off 
course. The pilot of the P-63 Kingcobra assigned to chase the JB-2 launched on 
November 11 had the best view of the program’s earliest triumph. This missile 
accelerated to over four hundred miles per hour, pulling away from the P-63. The pilot 
lost visual contact as it headed south over the Gulf of Mexico. Though the only test to 
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attain such results among these early attempts, it provided USAAF Commanding General 
Arnold justification to increase JB-2 production priority to AA-1 (the highest status) two 
months later.
53
 
Designated project MX-544 (missile experimental) by the USAAF upon its 
inception, Proving Ground Command referred to the JB-2 program at Range 64 as Jet 
Propulsion Bomb, Service Test 4-44-44. Captain Frank Kabase, as Service Test Officer, 
oversaw the preparation of accurate monthly reports, among a myriad of other duties.  In 
the Remarks section of the November 1944 report, dated December 1, the following 
explanation appears, “Test carried on I status major part of month due to lack of rockets 
for launching bomb.” The “I” referred to “inactive.” The officers and men of the test 
squadrons, the missiles, and the chase planes stood ready, but without booster rockets the 
entire program stood down. Frustrations with the RATO boosters went beyond the 
logistics of supply.
54
 
Ten of the first seventeen JB-2 launches ended in crashes due to launch problems, 
and most of these issues directly related to the rocket assisted take-off system. Until the 
Allies captured the first V-1 site in September 1944, they did not know what powered the 
German launch ramps. Early in the program engineers decided to use multiple RATO 
boosters to accelerate the JB-2 up to flying speed, as the missile’s engine lacked the 
power to self-launch the craft. By the time allied ground forces discovered that the 
German V-1 ramps used a combination of hydrogen peroxide and potassium 
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permanganate to create a compressed gas that accelerated the missile to take off speed, 
the USAAF had already committed to a contract with Monsanto for RATOs. The JB-2 
development team soon discovered that facilities to produce sufficient quantities of the 
chemicals used in the German launchers did not exist in the U.S. anyway. Sources of the 
era also express the dangerous nature of the hydrogen peroxide-potassium permanganate 
mixture, but subsequent documentation proves it more stable than the solid rocket fuel 
(ammonium picrate and potassium nitrate with a resin binder) used in the American 
Monsanto RATO boosters.
55
 
The high hopes built from the successful flight of test number eight on November 
11 fell deeply with number nine on November 17. On the six-degree four-hundred-foot 
inclined ramp two of the five RATO boosters exploded during the take off roll, and an 
attachment lug connecting the missile to its launch cart failed. The lug failure allowed the 
cart to shoot out from under the flying bomb. With no way to achieve flying speed, the 
missile crashed just off the ramp. (This particular failure deflated Army pride, due to on 
site observers from the Navy’s Bureau of Ordinance in the process of acquiring their own 
JB-2s for use at sea). The cart, which secured the booster rockets and supported the JB-2, 
had to separate from the missile immediately after launch or the extra weight would stall 
the aircraft. A number of missiles crashed from being struck by their own launch carts 
after, or during, the release of the launch cart. Test number ten on November 21 went 
wrong early when an attachment lug failed to release the jet bomb from its sled. As the 
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JB-2 dragged its cart into the air, the missile was hit time and time again by the flailing 
launch cart until the sled knocked the tail off the fuselage.
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In the midst of these disappointments the Pentagon decided to go public with the 
JB-2 program as a part of the continuing efforts of the Office of War Information (OWI) 
to promote patriotism, boost war bond sales, and support morale on the Home Front by 
releasing news of the launches in a press conference at Wright Field, Ohio, on November 
22. The New York Herald Tribune had the story in its November 23, 1944, issue. The 
USAAF had confirmed the missile’s existence publicly in September, seeing no reason to 
deny it since Nazi V-1 missiles were regularly featured in the war news in the press and 
news reels. However, the army kept details on JB-2 construction and testing shrouded 
until the OWI completed a publicity plan. Under the headline, “Army Develops ‘A Good 
Robot’—Just in Case!” the writer explained the rush to reproduce the German V-1, and 
provided a decent explanation of how the missile worked. The article included a 
photograph showing the JB-2 at “an undisclosed proving ground” and the caption cheered 
the improved launching ramp, which allegedly could be built ten days faster than the 
German design. Major General Bennet E. Myers, Deputy Director of the Air Force 
Technical Service Command, opined, “We may never need the robot bomb, for the Army 
Air Forces do not go in for indiscriminate bombing attacks. But if we do need it, we’ve 
got a good one.” Perhaps Myers believed his own spin, but the devastating fire-bombing 
of Dresden and Tokyo (not to mention the nuclear fission above Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki) in the coming months would juxtapose the USAAF’s strategic bombing policy 
upon “indiscriminate bombing attacks” in a way that historians continue to debate. The 
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United States had a terror weapon in the JB-2, no different than the V-1 from which it 
came, and would not hesitate to use it if necessary.
57
 
The disappointing test launches of November 17 and 21 faded under the success 
of test numbers eleven and twelve on December 6 and 9. Each of these launches gave 
validity to new techniques. The test on December 6 proved that successful launches could 
be made from the 500 foot level track ramp. This missile achieved a take off speed of 300 
miles per hour, climbed into the overcast at 1,500 feet and flew 22.5 miles, tracked by 
radar. The launch on December 9 was significant in that it proved four RATO boosters 
could be used successfully rather than five. On the 400-foot, 6-degree inclined ramp the 
JB-2 reached a speed of 225 mph. Upon leaving the ramp the aircraft lost altitude briefly 
before it recovered and climbed to its preset altitude of 2,000 feet on course. At its preset 
range termination of 50 miles, the robot bomb dived to the water.
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RATO discharge and launch cart separation from JB-2, Range 64, 1944.
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The same date, December 9, Willys-Overland distributed a press release heralding 
the company’s triumphant production of America’s robot bomb. Wishing to capitalize on 
the recent media attention given the JB-2 by the USAAF press conference, the maker of 
the ubiquitous and now-famous Jeep wanted the nation to know its role in creating a 
winged cousin to its indispensable military four-wheel-drive vehicle. The prestigious Carl 
Byoir & Associates public relations firm in New York sang the praises of the Toledo 
company in a press release titled, “Willys-Overland Now Turning Out U.S. ‘Buzz 
Bomb’.” Though Republic Aviation received the contract for JB-2 airframe production, 
they quickly found themselves unable to meet the demand given their other contracts 
such as supplying P-47 Thunderbolt fighter planes. Republic subcontracted the job to 
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Willys-Overland, which made 1,292 of the 1,382 JB-2s produced, fabricating all but the 
engines, control system and boosters. Company President Charles E. Sorensen revealed 
that, “Mass production facilities were installed and production operations on the aerial 
bombs were underway 60 days after receipt of the contract.” Cleared by the U.S. Army 
Bureau of Public Relations, the release goes into surprising detail on the missile’s 
components.
60
 
JB-2 tests numbered 13, 14, and 15 exemplified the continuing ups and downs of 
the roller coaster ride experienced by the Army Air Force’s guided missile development 
program. Both the flying bomb and the launching cart (fitted with four RATO boosters) 
disintegrated above the level ramp during the December 12 test (number 13) when 
technicians piled sand off the end of the track to prevent damage to the launching cart 
(from rolling off the end of the rails), in hopes that carts might be re-used for subsequent 
tests. After missile separation the cart hit the sand launching itself into the JB-2, ending 
cart conservation efforts. Two days later (December 14, test number 14), again on the 
500-foot level ramp using four rockets, “The bomb attained an altitude of 3,800 feet and 
a speed of approximately 350 miles per hour, before diving in due to air log action at a 
range of 55 miles.” Encouragement from this achievement receded on December 17 
when the last JB-2 test launch of 1944 (number 15), also on the level track with four 
rockets, crashed shortly after take-off, “due to failure of the motor metering units.”61 
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The successful launch on December 14 occurred on the same day the American 
public got its first glimpse of the JB-2. Headlined, “Crowd Gets First View of Robot 
Bomb” a New York Sun story explained,  
New Yorkers had a close-up of a buzz bomb today when a duplicate of the 
German robot, built by Republic Aviation Corporation of Farmingdale, L. 
I., was trundled into Father Duffy Square at 47
th
 Street and Broadway, 
aboard a forty foot trailer and placed on exhibition at the Winged Victory 
display there. The robot was brought across the Queensboro Bridge from 
Long Island, causing considerable excitement along the way, and will 
remain on display until December 20.
62
  
 
The OWI created this JB-2 display as part of a media event promoting the film Winged 
Victory, a propaganda piece written by Moss Hart (You Can’t Take It With You and The 
Man Who Came to Dinner) to be released December 22 across the country to raise money 
for Army charities. Winged Victory and its supporting JB-2 exhibit as one of hundreds of 
innovative propaganda efforts OWI initiated to remind the public to fully support the war 
effort. Hollywood, with its weekly film audience of eighty million Americans, acted as a 
crucial part of the U.S. war machine 
63
 
As 1944 drew to a close, Proving Ground Command placed the JB-2 program in 
full development mode. The Army Air Forces “Guided Missile Development Status and 
Availability” progress report listed ongoing activities in addition to launch tests. The 
most immediate questions to be answered from missile tests addressed the minimum 
length of ramp required to launch with four RATO units and gauging the responsiveness 
of the preset guidance system. The Aircraft Radio Laboratory at Wright Field initiated the 
fabrication of a remote radio/radar control system for the JB-2 to improve the missile’s 
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accuracy. A captured German V-1 launching ramp arrived at Range 64, slated for use 
beginning in January. To that end Eglin technicians ordered 4,000 pounds of hydrogen 
peroxide and 400 pounds of calcium permanganate to recreate the German launching 
method. Project engineers investigated several mechanical launching mechanisms, 
including an air turbine, a large flywheel and cable system, windlass and cable system, 
and a flash steam boiler system. Technical Service Command drafted preliminary design 
systems for launching two JB-2s from a B-17 Flying Fortress bomber in flight. The latest 
missile progress report listed seventy-five JB-2s completed on the assembly line, and 
confirmed authority received from the War Production Board (WPB) for the procurement 
of an additional 1,000 missiles and 10,000 additional RATO units. The WPB revised cost 
estimates to $7,925 per complete JB-2 and $1,888 for each launching cart with rockets 
for a total of $9,813 taxpayer dollars per launch.
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A final word from the press in 1944, concluding the OWI publicity blitz that 
began with the November press conference at Wright Field, came from a newspaper 
article on December 30 that hints at potential JB-2 usage in the coming year. A headline 
touting, “U.S. Rockets Mean Trouble for Foes” over the two-column report is followed 
by a sub-header stating, “Yankee Doodle Robomb; Undergoing Tests, Assures Precision 
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controllers transmitted radio guidance signals back to the missile based on its radar tracking. In 1950 the 
Navy developed the first true “radar control” by utilizing the same radar signal to both track the missile and 
send guidance control corrections, thereby eliminating the need for transmissions from a separate radio 
unit. This Navy achievement is discussed below in Chapter II: Sailing to Sunset.  
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Attacks on Tokyo, Nazis.” Citing unnamed “officials” the story argues the JB-2 is a, 
“great improvement over anything that Nazi scientists have been able to produce.” 
Readers are told how the U.S. took the design of the V-1 and, “molded it into the Yankee 
Doodle robomb which may be used next year for precision bombing attacks on Tokyo 
and German cities.” As a propaganda piece the article clearly shines in patriotic duty 
toward the psychological war effort, but given the unsteady status of JB-2 testing at the 
time, any semblance of the truth is dubious, though, arguably, irrelevant to the intent. 
Explaining the motive of journalists of the era, historian Michael Sherry explains, “They 
saw themselves as enlisted in the war effort, their task that of establishing confidence in 
Allied virtue and victory and commanders. …Americans still needed to view the war as a 
positive experience.” The headline of this story also serves as a reminder that neither the 
media nor the public yet understood the difference between a rocket and a jet in 1944.
65
 
As the JB-2 emerged as a media darling, the USAAF Technical Service 
Command continued work on nine other jet bomb (JB) missiles. Sequentially numbered 
based on the initiation date of each project, only the JB-2 reached the production line. In 
spite of mixed results in early testing, Proving Ground Command recognized the clear 
superiority of the JB-2 in comparison to the other JB designs. As the American “buzz-
bomb” proved itself as the most successful, and ultimately most important, missile in the 
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Air Force arsenal, concurrent JB designs faced irrelevance. However, one JB project pre-
dated the JB-2, and its prototype soon appeared on Range 64.
66
 
The designation JB-1 belonged to a jet bomb designed by Northrop Aviation, 
which began development prior to the JB-2 as project MX-543. Convinced that 
maximum aerodynamic efficiency could best be achieved with a wing design that 
provided stability and control without the drag induced by an additional horizontal 
stabilizer, elevator, vertical tail plane, or rudder, company founder Jack Northrop created 
a “flying wing” for the JB-1 (although Northrop eliminated the rudder, stability concerns 
resulted in the JB-1 retaining a vertical tail plane). This wing concept achieved varying 
success in aircraft until it was ultimately proven successful in the present-day B-2 
bomber, which does not employ a vertical stabilizer or rudder. A manned-glider version 
of the JB-1 tested successfully prior to the first powered launch attempt.
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JB-1 prototype (foreground) and JB-2s at missile barn, Range 64, December 1944.
68
 
 
Technological concerns plagued the initial JB-1 test from the start of operations at 
Eglin Proving Ground (Range 64) in early December 1944. Army Air Force requirements 
called for four hundred pounds of thrust from each of the two jet engines, but the 
completed General Electric Type BI turbo supercharger power plants could only muster 
half the requested power. With just two hundred pounds of thrust from each engine, the 
JB-1 had to be launched in a lightweight condition. Difficulties encountered with the 
ignition system, and a series of fuel leaks, delayed the test 24 hours. The next day, 
December 7, 1944, technicians placed the JB-1 on the five-hundred-foot, level launch 
ramp, attached to a modified JB-2 launch cart with two RATO units, at a nine-degree 
nose-up attitude with its two elevons (movable surfaces at the trailing edge of the wing 
providing both pitch and roll control) also adjusted to nine degrees. The launch team 
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started the engines with compressed air and spark from a high voltage transformer. Just 
thirty seconds before launch time, with the engines at full speed, considerable sparking 
began coming out of the right tailpipe. Nonetheless, the countdown continued and the JB-
1 roared down the track at two hundred thirty feet per second. The jet bomb departed the 
launch cart and nosed up to a forty-five degree angle, climbing rapidly until the wing 
stalled and the missile crashed into the surf after a five-second, four-hundred-yard dash 
from the ramp. Salvage revealed the source of the engine sparks during the launch 
sequence to be the shearing off of half of the turbo blades. Engineers determined the 
elevons being set at too great a positive angle caused the steep climb and stall. By 
December 21, after extensive review, Northrop decided to drop the General Electric turbo 
jets in favor of the more reliable and proven pulse-jet engine of the JB-2. This design 
change resulted in the close of the JB-1 designation with only one unit produced and 
tested, and led to the production of the JB-10 which incorporated a single pulse-jet engine 
in the center of the missile’s fuselage surrounded by a special cooling shroud. Testing of 
the JB-10 would follow in 1945, but also ended in failure.
69
 
The ten jet bomb projects included a broad range of designs. However, the 
Technical Service Command cancelled four of the JB missiles (JB-5, JB-6, JB-7 and JB-
9) in the concept or design phase. Hughes Aircraft developed the JB-3 (MX-570) Tiamat 
subsonic air-to-air missile. Test launched from the ground and from an A-26 aircraft, this 
design featured three large fins at the tail with active control surfaces. The JB-4 (MX-
607), essentially a modification of the existing GB-4 guided glide bomb, featured a Ford 
PJ31 pulse-jet engine. The JB-5 (MX-595) designers envisioned an unguided, wingless 
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air-to-surface rocket that had a six-mile range. The JB-6 (MX-600), also an air-to-surface 
guided missile, would have been spin-stabilized and supersonic. Design details of the JB-
7 (MX-605) show a high-speed, jet-powered research craft. Boeing developed the JB-8 
(MX-606) as a surface-to-air guided missile. Plans for the JB-9 (possibly known as 
project MX-626) called for a short-range, surface to surface missile design.
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As 1944 drew to a close Technical Service Command evaluated whether 
continuing multiple JB initiatives made sense, given the operational capability of the JB-
2 along with its ongoing factory production run, and the failure of the JB-1. Ultimately, 
the Air Force chose to focus solely on the JB-2, trusting test results would improve over 
time.  
After a three week hiatus, JB-2 testing at Range 64 resumed on January 10 and 
again on January 12, 1945, but both missiles burned on the launch ramp when RATO 
rockets exploded, causing the fuel to combust. A week later the crash percentage of JB-2 
tests rose to 62.5% with 15 of the first 24 test launches ending in failure either during the 
launch sequence or shortly thereafter.
71
 
Unaffected by the troubled test program, General Arnold, in a clear departure 
from USAAF precision bombing doctrine, increased the order for 1,000 JB-2s to a 
staggering 75,000 missiles on January 14. The following day Arnold gave the JB-2 
project the highest priority (AA-1), equal to the production priority of the B-29 
Superfortress bomber. Arnold based his support of the project on the same advantages the 
German high command saw in the missile. The weapon put no pilot or crew at risk 
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delivering its ordnance, its small size, high speed, and low altitude approach made it 
difficult to destroy, and it could be launched at any time in any weather conditions. The 
design consisted almost entirely of sheet steel; it did not expend critical war production 
materials such as aircraft aluminum. Cheap to produce, the flying bomb could readily be 
deployed and consumed in mass quantities without depleting precious human and 
materiel resources. Arnold’s decision to multiply the JB-2 production order by seventy-
five occurred immediately following the Battle of the Bulge, a major German offensive 
that caught Allied forces completely by surprise and resulted in massive casualties, 
materiel loss, and the delay of the end of the war in Europe. Eisenhower, himself a 
proponent of the JB-2, could not allow such a large scale attack to occur again. Pushed by 
his superiors to deliver as many missiles to the European Theater as possible, and faced 
with the possibility of losing control of the JB-2 program to the Army Ground Forces if 
he failed, Arnold persevered.
72
  
Yet the JB-2 had the same disadvantages as the V-1. Once launched, the missile 
could not be terminated, nor its course altered. Ground launched JB-2s required booster 
rockets and a ramp, which not only revealed the missile’s predictable and unchangeable 
flight path to the enemy, but also made an attractive, identifiable target despite 
camouflage efforts. A predictable flight path gave notice to the intended target, allowing 
the enemy to focus defenses efficiently. The poor accuracy of the JB-2, a probability of 
impacting within a radius of 8 miles, required that only large areas (cities) could be 
focused upon. The relatively small size of the missile limited the payload of its explosive 
warhead to just below one ton, and thus its ability to inflict damage. This inability to aim 
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at a precise target, and a comparatively low destructive force, relegated the JB-2 (and its 
predecessor, the V-1) to a psychological terror weapon. Both Germany and the United 
States proved equally willing to employ it as such.
73
    
Critics of the JB-2 expressed concerns that resources dedicated to its production 
would affect the production and availability of bombs and artillery shells. Within two 
weeks of General Arnold’s 75,000 missile order, budget projections determined that the 
new program would consume up to twenty-five percent of shipping bound for the 
European Theater of Operations and cost over one billion dollars. Unwilling to dedicate 
so much support to an unproven weapon, the War Department, upon consultation with 
the Air Materiel Command, reduced the total order to 10,000 units.
74
  
Evaluating launch methodology presented a continual challenge to JB-2 testing 
throughout the missile’s service life. The most prevalent problem in the first five months 
of testing centered on the reliability and stability of RATO rockets used to propel the 
missile up to flight speed on the ramps at Range 64. As JB-2 testing continued through 
the first months of 1945, the initiative to air-launch the missiles from B-17 bombers in 
flight (designed in part to resolve the continuing problems with RATO ground launches) 
entered the trial phase. Inspired by the V-1s fired in flight from the Luftwaffe’s Heinkel 
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He-111 bomber, airmen modified one USAAF B-17 bomber at Eglin Field to carry two 
JB-2 missiles (one under each wing). The first successful air launch of JB-2s from the B-
17 occurred on March 2, 1945. Bomber crews launched a total of ten JB-2s during March 
and April. Launching in flight eliminated the need for RATO units to accelerate the buzz 
bombs to a speed that allowed the missile to attain lift, as the B-17 simply had to 
maintain an indicated airspeed between 180 miles per hour and 220 miles per hour prior 
to missile release. The airspeed also eliminated the need for an air compressor, required 
during ground launches to provide forced air into the pulse-jet engine to allow ignition. 
However, five of the missiles launched from the bomber experienced engine starting 
malfunctions, resulting in unsuccessful flights. Of the remaining air launches, four proved 
successful and one experienced a control malfunction causing it to nose-dive into the 
Gulf of Mexico. The test report concluded that JB-2s may be launched successfully from 
a B-17, and that the engine failures could be eliminated by the installation of a motorized 
fuel valve. Adding air-launch capability to the JB-2 increased its limited one-hundred-
mile range to over one thousand miles, but other problems remained to be solved with the 
American buzz bomb.
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First launch of JB-2 missiles from B-17 bomber, March 2, 1945.
76
 
 
The USAAF took delivery of 437 JB-2s by the first week of April 1945 and 47 
successful test launches had occurred after 71 attempts, raising the overall success rate to 
66 percent. Testing confirmed the most successful method for ground launch utilized four 
RATO units. Much enthusiasm grew from the tests with the so-called “Zero launch 
ramp,” that required only forty feet of ramp length to attain missile flight speed with the 
RATO nozzles turned downward and to the side. This RATO configuration allowed for a 
vertical thrust component strong enough to maintain a positive rate of climb for the JB-2 
using only one-tenth the length of the longer ramps. The “Zero” method provided 
significant mobility, defense and stealth advantages, particularly with truck and trailer 
launch units. Test missiles flew between 350 miles per hour and 430 miles per hour, 
usually at altitudes between 1,500 feet and 2,500 feet, but one JB-2 performed 
successfully at an altitude of 10,500 feet. Maximum range increased to approximately 
130 miles, but accuracy did not improve. All JB-2s launched to date applied mechanical 
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guidance through a clock and compass within the pilotless bomb setting range and course 
(like the V-1). The dive command to the target area utilized the German impeller timing 
system that locked the control linkage to the elevator into full rapid descent position at 
the correct moment in flight. The large target area this system provided (an eight-mile or 
more radius) limited the use of the missile to terrorizing large urban areas. Because of its 
imprecise targeting ability and less than fool-proof guidance systems, none of the JB-2s 
test launched at Eglin carried the 1,870 pounds of Tritanol explosive designed for its 
warhead; instead the missiles carried a sand and aggregate concrete ballast to maintain a 
proper aerodynamic weight and balance.
77
 
As successful launches increased, JB-2 technological teams concentrated on 
guidance and accuracy as the pressing concerns with the new missile. In April, engineers 
at the Aircraft Radio Laboratory at Wright Field completed development of a radio/radar 
control system utilizing the highly accurate and battlefield proven SCR-584 microwave 
radar unit to track an AN/APW-1 radar transceiver installed in the JB-2; allowing the 
missile to transmit a locator beacon and receive multiple radio control signals from the 
ground. Technicians installed the AN/APW-1 in a C-45 Expeditor transport aircraft for 
initial trials. Proving Ground Command employed a similar control system, previously 
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tested at Eglin, in what the Army Air Force called “Willie Orphans,” war-weary B-17 and 
B-24 bombers (without pilots or crew) packed with explosives flown by remote ground 
radio/radar control to a given target. Concurrently, the Technical Service Command 
created an electronic system to ignite small explosive charges that would separate the 
wings from a JB-2 missile in flight. The hypothesis for wing separation presumed that a 
missile rendered wingless at a precisely timed moment would have a more predictable, 
controlled, and therefore more accurate, trajectory toward a target.
78
 
The development of reliable radio guidance, radar tracking, and wing separation 
in JB-2 systems design marked a pivotal moment of transition from the mechanical to the 
electronic age in cruise missile technology. No longer an exact American copy of a 
German design, the JB-2 began to transcend its origins, taking the next steps in cruise 
missile evolution toward new generations more complex, adaptable to changing strategies 
and tactics, with perhaps unlimited growth potential. 
With the surrender of Germany in May 1945, the opportunity to deploy an 
operational American cruise missile focused on targets within the Japanese home islands. 
Possibilities for using the JB-2 in the Pacific moved from plausible to probable in War 
Department discussions during the summer. The Navy wanted their own JB-2s, wishing 
to execute a plan, under development since the previous September, to launch the 
missiles from an aircraft carrier. The Navy’s Bureau of Aeronautics procured fifty-one 
JB-2s, with an additional one hundred to be delivered. Ground testing of the Navy 
missiles would take place at Point Mugu, California. A joint Army/Navy program to 
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launch JB-2s from LST (Landing Ship Tank) vessels benefitted from unusually amicable 
inter-service cooperation. As plans progressed for the invasion of Japan, Army planners 
counted JB-2s as a part of the ground forces arsenal available once beachheads were 
established.
79
 
 
JB-2 on “zero launch” mobile ramp at Range 64, 1945.80 
 
Pressure to improve the accuracy of the JB-2 increased with its planned 
deployment against Japan. With all missiles at Range 64 on Eglin Field fired out to sea, 
Proving Ground Command was limited in its ability to assess and improve accuracy. 
Precise measurements could not be obtained on the water, with the impact point of the 
flying bomb quickly erased by the waves. Further, a pilotless aircraft resting at the 
bottom of the Gulf of Mexico prohibited examination of any malfunctioning components. 
On June 22 the Army Air Force selected the expansive and desolate Wendover Army Air 
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Field Range in Utah as the next JB-2 testing site, to conduct launches concurrent with 
those ongoing at Eglin. Testing on the Wendover range also allowed the use of live 
warheads on JB-2s for the first time.
81
 
Retired USAF Major Phil Mack, who served as Operations Officer at Wendover 
in 1945, provided a chase pilot’s perspective on JB-2 testing. Launch teams in Utah 
utilized an eighty-foot inclined ramp with the same RATO-powered launch cart used at 
Eglin. Wendover benefitted from an added fail safe at the far end of the target area. In 
addition to a fighter plane giving chase and, if necessary, shooting down a rogue missile, 
a mountain range stopped any errant JB-2s that failed to dive when they were pre-set, or 
radio-controlled, to do so. JB-2s often outpaced their chase planes. 
On the occasion of the first launch, I flew the P-51 in a pattern and 
approaching the launch ramp, I gave the signal by radio to the ground 
crew. On schedule, the four rockets on the launching sled went off giving 
a large cloud of smoke. I flew through the cloud on instruments, and upon 
passing out of the smoke, looked for the missile and found it right in front 
of me. From that point I could fly formation with the bomb, observe its 
flight characteristics, shoot it down if needed, and take pictures with a 
GSAP camera of the flight. Once the bomb reached its cruise altitude, 
which wasn’t very high, the bomb flew faster than I could in the P-51 at 
max continuous power. As I recall, the length of the range was about 80 
miles. It had been planned that the bomb, if it failed to dump, and if it was 
impossible for me to shoot it down, would fly harmlessly into the 
uninhabited mountain range. This is exactly what happened on the first 
launch.
82
 
 
Atomic bombs dropped from B-29 bombers destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
six weeks later; the resulting new paradigm for warfare called into question the need for 
conventional weaponry, including the JB-2. Yet the testing continued at Eglin and 
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Wendover, through the Japanese surrender of September 2, the cancellation of contracts 
with all manufacturers of JB-2 components on September 15, and beyond. Both the Army 
and Navy remained committed to the missile in the midst of the massive military 
demobilization, facing an uncertain future. Having lost the opportunity for combat trials, 
America’s armed forces began to recognize the value of the JB-2 in a world where large 
scale attacks may be initiated remotely, by the push of a button. The transition from 
weapon to research vehicle had begun for the buzz bomb.
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Eglin built a new test facility for the JB-2, and the Wendover accuracy tests rolled 
forward through 1946. Range 64, in accordance with the lease agreement, had to be 
returned to its civilian owner upon the cessation of hostilities. Of the 1,382 JB-2s 
received by the Army Air Force, Range 64 personnel launched 233 between October 
1944 and October 1945. Proving Ground Command cancelled the test launches in 
November, and ordered the facilities at Range 64 to be deconstructed, removed or 
abandoned by December 12. Planning for a new 4,700 acre ground missile launching site 
at Eglin, to be located twenty-two miles west along the Gulf coast on Santa Rosa Island, 
began prior to V-J Day. Construction of this new range commenced in January.
84
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The Air Technical Service Command detachment at Wendover conducted tests to 
determine the accuracy, reliability and limitations of JB-2s guided by remote radar/radio 
ground control from September 1945 through January 1946. These radar-controlled tests 
resulted in much improved accuracy, with the missiles impacting within one-half to one 
and one-half miles of the target marker with a maximum range of eighty-five miles.
85
  
In a memo dated March 1, 1946, designed to summarize the development of the 
JB-2, Proving Ground Command presented the following conclusions, somewhat 
inflated: the preset mechanically controlled version of the JB-2 could carry an armed 
warhead up to 150 miles at 400 miles per hour with a 50 percent accuracy rate within a 5 
mile radius of target center which rendered it, “suitable for area bombing of cities or 
other large areas;” and, “The remotely controlled version of the JB-2 is limited to 
distances of 100 miles. Consistent hits are possible within an area ½ mile square.” The 
memo asserted that the initial development phase of the JB-2 had been completed as 
provided for under the original expenditure order.
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A Cultural Resource Perspective: A Place of War, Peace, and Mistaken Identity 
The former area of Range 64, where the JB-2 test program began, is now Coffeen 
Nature Preserve in Four-Mile-Village; the roar of rockets and jet engines has given way 
to the calls of osprey and mockingbirds. John and Dorothy Coffeen moved back to their 
property in 1946, and made the former military mess hall their home for the next thirty 
years. The Coffeens turned the abandoned barracks, missile barns and machine shop into 
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storage facilities and garages. They enjoyed the convenience of a multitude of paved 
roads the Army had left behind, but had no use for the concrete structures: four launch 
bunkers, two 400-foot launch ramps, a magnetic compass calibration swing base, and 
assorted piers and foundations that remain on the property to this day. In the dunes near 
the beach, sheltered by scrub brush, lies a rusty JB-2, the sole survivor of hundreds of test 
missiles launched toward the Gulf here. Shortly after John’s death, in 1976 Dorothy 
donated 197 acres of her property to the Sierra Club to create a nature preserve that she 
hoped would be, “A place of peace, a place of quiet, and a refuge for all God’s 
creatures.” When Dorothy passed two years later, she bequeathed the remaining property 
(28 acres) to the preserve.
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In 1996, the Keeper of the National Register of Historic Places approved a 
nomination to add two JB-2 launch areas, archaeological sites 80k246 and 80k248 on 
Santa Rosa Island, to the Register. The nomination stated the USAAF constructed these 
two sites, approximately one-half mile apart, in 1944 and maintained operations thereon 
from 1944 to 1946. Unfortunately, this is incorrect. The sites on Santa Rosa Island 
(8Ok246 and 8Ok248), are twenty-two miles west of Coffeen Nature Preserve (formerly 
Range 64) where World War II JB-2 testing occurred. Santa Rosa Island did not transfer 
to the War Department until August 13, 1945, and missile launch facility construction did
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not begin there until 1946. Thus, neither archaeological site (8Ok246 or 8Ok248) has 
significance related to World War II, as the nomination states.
88
  
Despite the error in the nomination, all three locations, Range 64 (Coffeen Nature 
Preserve), and the JB-2 launch areas on Santa Rosa Island (archaeological sites 8Ok246 
and 8Ok248), are historically significant and deserve placement on the National Register, 
as evidenced in this chapter as well as Chapter II and Appendix. With regard to World 
War II, the Coffeen Nature Preserve (Range 64) embodies a high level of significance.89 
The material culture remaining on Range 64 qualifies under Criterion D of the 
National Register as, “archaeological remains that have yielded, and are likely to 
continue to yield, information important in history.” Criterion D requires such sites to 
demonstrate the information contained at the location within an appropriate 
historic/archaeological context, the connection between the information and the specific 
property, and the presence of adequate data on site. The important information on the site 
of Range 64 includes the design features, construction materials, and evidence of 
operational use conveyed through two earthen launch ramps, two concrete bunkers, a 
concrete compass calibration swing base, missile barn, machine shop, mess hall and 
barracks remaining as symbols of the historical context discussed above (World War II, 
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military aviation, and Florida aviation). The connection between the information at the 
location is self-evident, as the material culture remains in situ, and the presence of 
adequate data on site is amply demonstrated through the multiple structures extant.
90
 
Whereas a case for National Register eligibility of Coffeen Nature Preserve 
(Range 64) may be established from World War II testing and its implications, the JB-2 
sites on Santa Rosa Island are significant because they represent a transition from 
research and development related to World War II to that of the early Cold War. The 
Army and Navy, facing an uncertain future as the military forces of a new world 
superpower in the nuclear age, continued to push for new technologies that would 
provide any advantage over threats unknown. The relief from the end of world war was 
short-lived, as the Soviet Union, unwilling to leave the eastern European countries it 
pushed through to defeat Germany, began the transition from ally to enemy. The JB-2 
became less important as a weapon of readiness, and more important as a technological 
step on the steep learning curve of guided missile warfare. 
Both Range 64 and the JB-2 installations on Santa Rosa Island are cultural 
landscapes. The sites are best understood as geographical areas created by an American 
military motivated by the societal values of ending conflict (World War II), prevention 
of, or preparedness for, future conflict (Cold War), the need for self-preservation 
common to all cultures, and the belief that advancing technology helps make each of 
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these possible. The abandoned missile launch facilities are evocative of these values, 
conveying cultural meaning through their remains.
91
 
The placement of JB-2 sites in secluded, secure areas, like most military facilities, 
also bears cultural meaning. This spatial relationship to public and private land indicates 
Americans were (and are) generally comfortable with their armed forces operating 
largely in secret toward the perceived protection of United States lifeways. 
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CHAPTER TWO: TESTS AND GLOBAL STRESS (1946-1953) 
 
Malaise, Moscow, and Mission  
 
When JB-2 testing came to an end at Eglin in October 1945 and at Wendover in 
January 1946, program personnel pondered the plight of a conventional missile in an 
atomic age where allies became enemies. After the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki the JB-2, and many other weapons dwarfed by the power of fission, seemed 
obsolete and irrelevant for a time. The global shockwave of realization reached far 
beyond those generated by the A-bombs dropped from B-29 bombers Enola Gay and 
Bock’s Car, as the world’s population struggled to comprehend the terrible technology 
now solely in the hands of the United States. America stood, “at the pinnacle of world 
power” according to Winston Churchill, addressing an international broadcast audience 
from Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, on March 5, 1946. Although the former 
British Prime Minister titled this speech “The Sinews of Peace” it was his use of the term 
“iron curtain” that resonated; used to describe the Soviet Union’s continuing occupation 
of Eastern Europe (almost a year after German forces surrendered) that fired imagination, 
distrust, and fear on both sides of this metaphorical tapestry. Cold War historians Randall 
B. Woods and Howard Jones explain that Americans, “wanted to enjoy the fruits of 
victory, but events would not let them. The United States had learned the folly of 
appeasement and unpreparedness, but it wanted nothing so much as to be left alone to
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pursue the American dream of self-sufficient prosperity. The bomb made confrontation 
with the Soviets a terrifying prospect.”92 
Less than two weeks prior to Churchill’s address, on February 22, a junior 
diplomat at the American Embassy in Moscow sent a prophetic cable that became 
famously known as the “Long Telegram” scholars consider the progenitor of the “policy 
of containment” adopted by the administration of Harry S. Truman and sustained 
throughout the entire Cold War. George F. Kennan used his reply to a U.S. Treasury 
query about the Soviet economy to expound broadly on his recommendations for 
American foreign policy toward the Kremlin. Arguing that the Kremlin respected only 
strength, a point Churchill emphasized later at Fulton College, Kennan wrote that Soviet 
power was, “impervious to the logic of reason” and “highly sensitive to the logic of 
force.” Kennan suggested the United States should abandon any hope for a long-term 
resolution with Moscow and embrace that there will be two “spheres of influence” 
supported, if not controlled, by each side. President Truman and his cabinet read 
Kennan’s telegram, and Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal championed it as required 
reading for the U.S. officer corps at the command level. In a later report to Forrestal, 
Kennan defined containment stating, “In these circumstances it is clear that the main 
element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of long-term, 
patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.” Thwarting 
the spread of Communism, maintaining peace through strength, the president first 
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articulated the new policy, officially, on March 12, 1947, when he addressed a joint 
session of Congress asking for military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey in their 
struggle against communist subversion. Historians consider this executive 
pronouncement of containment as U.S. policy monumental, as its adoption marked the 
first time America became involved in European affairs during a time of peace. Truman’s 
speech made it clear that although he requested aid only for two Mediterranean nations, 
the broad threat to democracy existed in the form of Communism wherever it may 
appear; and a precedent now existed which soon became known as the Truman 
Doctrine.
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While the American policy of containment arose, and most of the U.S. military 
focused on rapid and rampant demobilization following World War II, the JB-2 program 
found renewed relevance. Stalin’s decision to retain Eastern European nations as Soviet 
satellites in late 1945 convinced the American military that weaponry such as the JB-2 
might find an application should the new Cold War turn hot. Contingency planners at the 
Pentagon surmised if the effort to prevent the expansion of Communism required force of 
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arms, or simply a threat to deploy them, the JB-2 represented new technology essential to 
containment. The existence of this flying bomb, the world’s first practical and operational 
cruise missile, and, more importantly, the future generations of missiles it would spawn, 
provided a means by which deterrence might be achieved in the weapon, its development 
potential, and the training of “missileers” who would ultimately hold the keys 
(figuratively and literally) to the prospect of mutual destruction; a new class of warriors 
for a remote-controlled war. Commanders of the United States Army Air Force (USAAF) 
especially marketed the JB-2 for this role, as they prepared to divorce themselves from 
the Army to become the leaders of the United States Air Force (USAF), a separate 
military branch equal to the Army and Navy. Seeking equilibrium in power to their Army 
and Navy counterparts, USAF general staff wanted to stake a clear claim to the new 
cruise missile technology, also coveted by Army ground forces. Officially created as a 
part of the National Security Act in September, 1947, the USAF won its case for the JB-2 
and future cruise missiles, though the technology would continue to be a shared 
development with the Navy. As the USA and USSR emerged as global superpowers, 
each employed captured German technology to attain an arms advantage for deterrence of 
direct conflict. America’s JB-2, (essentially born of the Third Reich) had a new mission. 
The German Air Ministry of World War II could not have foreseen their terror weapon 
used against the Soviet Union by the United States.
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Island Renewal, Cold Weather, and White Sands 
As the Air Force conducted the last JB-2 tests on Eglin in 1945 and on Wendover 
in 1946, they began construction of two new missile launch sites for the continuation of 
the program. JB-2 testing would start anew twenty-two miles west of the first JB-2 test 
site on an island south of Eglin Auxiliary Field #9 (Hurlburt Field). Santa Rosa Island 
offered a well-suited location for secret military operations such as JB-2 testing. With no 
bridge to the forty-five-mile-long barrier island off the Florida panhandle coast, it 
remained accessible only by watercraft, and it featured a Gulf shoreline bordering a 
virtually unlimited test range consisting entirely of seawater. In 1939 President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt approved the creation of the Santa Rosa Island National Monument, with 
the intent of preserving the area in its natural condition. However, during the week 
following the atomic bombing of Japan in August 1945, President Truman signed a 
proclamation that transferred the eastern half of the island from the Department of the 
Interior to the War Department. The Air Force completed the two JB-2 launch sites in 
1947, along with a number of support buildings and roads. The Army Corps of Engineers 
dredged the sound between the mainland and Santa Rosa, allowing barges to transport the 
missiles and support materiel to the launch complex, and set concrete receiving docks on 
the leeward shore.
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The USAAF activated the First Experimental Guided Missiles Group on February 
6, 1946, and assigned personnel to the JB-2 program testing two launch methods. A 
historic first for the Air Force, the mission of this new command unit focused solely on 
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the operation of guided missiles. The two launching areas (under construction on Santa 
Rosa Island at the time of the group’s creation) featured two concrete pads for fifty-foot-
long mobile ramps (mounted on flat-bed trailers) and a 400-foot-long inclined steel ramp 
on concrete piers. Located one half mile apart, each missile site housed launch controls in 
a concrete bunker, and exclusively used Rocket Assisted Take Off (RATO) propellant 
cylinders to accelerate the JB2s to flight speed. Previous testing at Range 64 during 1944 
and 1945, where experimentation with nine different ramp configurations occurred, 
resulted in more efficient methodology for Santa Rosa. The following present-day 
satellite photograph maps show the remains of both the mobile ramp launch facility 
(archaeological site 8Ok248) and the 400-foot steel ramp location (archaeological site 
8Ok246). These images are not only helpful as a visual aid in understanding the 
operational logistics of launching JB-2 missiles on Santa Rosa Island in the late 1940s, 
but also as illustrative  examples of how cultural landscapes, particularly military 
landscapes, are created, convey meaning, and retain integrity through time. Research 
conducted by the author failed to yield historic aerial photographs of either site.
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Satellite Photograph Map of JB-2 Mobile Ramp Site (8Ok248)
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Satellite Photograph Map of JB-2 400 Foot Ramp Site (8Ok246)
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JB-2 testing on Santa Rosa Island began in March 1947; one year after the 
program, and its supporting facilities, closed at Range 64. Staffing requirements, supply 
chain logistics, and the completion of construction at the new location caused the year-
long delay from the time the First Experimental Guided Missile Group formed to the first 
missile launch. While the missile men waited, Proving Ground Command sent the unit 
and its weapons to Ladd Field, Alaska for cold weather testing, where, “It was concluded 
that the JB-2 is capable of satisfactory operation in extreme low temperatures if internal 
operating and control systems are heated in flight.” Equally significant, Project Frigid 
determined, “Successful launchings of the JB-2 may be accomplished under combat 
conditions by the construction of a six-degree wooden ramp of simple design and a 
minimum length of thirty (30) feet.” No doubt the growing tensions between the US and 
USSR led to the extreme weather testing “under combat conditions” in proximity to 
Russia.
99
 
Arriving back on Santa Rosa, the missileers conducted testing from March 
through the remainder of 1947 and beyond. After a dozen successful launches in April, 
the airmen were plagued again, in May, by the failure of several booster rockets 
(RATOs). On June 10, unfolding world events prompted the Pentagon to order the First 
Experimental Guided Missiles Group to fire 179 JB-2s by rail ramps and 107 from 
aircraft in a program designed to compare the accuracy of missiles with the pre-set, 
mechanical guidance system against those under radio/radar control. As engineers created 
new radar guidance systems to improve range and accuracy for the next generation of 
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missiles, the JB-2, as the only operational cruise missile in the US arsenal, served as the 
sole test platform for these emerging technologies.  Air Proving Ground Commanding 
General Grandison Gardner considered the JB-2 test program, “invaluable to its 
application to future projects of similar scope now in the research and development 
stage.”100   
The renewed emphasis on JB-2 testing prompted upgrades in launch protocol on 
Santa Rosa, and the re-start of a JB-2 ground test program in the American Southwest. 
Eglin’s Proving Ground Command added the use of motion picture cameras to record 
each launch, more precise radar tracking, Lockheed P-80 Shooting Star jet fighters as 
chase planes, and crash boats stationed in the Gulf along the projected missile flight path 
(for both observation and air-sea rescue of chase pilots if necessary), to the list of 
standard operating procedures for each launch. In 1947 the JB-2 test program at 
Wendover Army Airfield, Utah, dormant since January 1946, moved to Alamogordo 
Army Airfield (re-named Holloman AFB in January 1948), New Mexico, and the 
adjacent White Sands Proving Ground (re-named White Sands Missile Range in 1958). 
Personnel at these installations, site of America’s first atomic bomb tests, concurrently 
tested captured German V-2 ballistic missiles. A brief eight-month evaluation began at 
Holloman/White Sands on April 23, 1948, wherein eleven radio-controlled JB-2s were 
launched until testing concluded on January 10, 1949. During the summer of 2012, a 
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writer for the Alamo Pulse photographed the remaining 400-foot, three-degree inclined 
launch track, along with its associated loading pit, blockhouse and blast wall.
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During the first few months of tests on Santa Rosa in 1947, missile crews used 
only the mobile, trailer-borne, fifty-foot “zero launch” ramp recently provided the 
designation “L-1” (used on what is now archaeological site 8OK248), as construction 
workers did not begin assembly of the 400-foot, six-degree fixed ramp (8OK246) until 
the middle of July. Tests using the L-1 ramp continued, uneventfully, through August and 
September, but during a launch on October 1 a JB-2 was destroyed when the RATO 
booster rockets exploded just after the missile left the ramp.
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Success in the air compensated for the October 1 failure on Santa Rosa a week 
later when the First Experimental Guided Missile Group launched its first two JB-2s from 
a B-17 bomber in flight above the island. Both air-launched missiles flew successfully on 
course until shot down by P-80 fighters ten miles off shore. Unlike ground-launched JB-
2s, those dropped from bombers did not require the problematic RATO booster rockets to 
achieve sufficient airspeed for flight. The “Flying Fortress” simply initiated a shallow 
dive to reach a speed of 200 miles per hour, and the pulse-jet engine on the missile 
received ignition spark remotely from controls inside the bomber just prior to its release 
from the mount beneath the wing of the B-17.
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The firsthand experiences of a veteran from the First Experimental Guided 
Missiles Group allow unique insight into each area of JB-2 operations at Eglin AFB 
during 1947. Oral history, despite its flaws from the frailties of human memory, often 
provides historical detail unavailable from original documentary and photographic 
sources. The personal experiences of a young airman on Santa Rosa Island are 
particularly helpful, offering a more complete view of the daily operations of America’s 
first cruise missile program.  
Immediately upon graduation from Air Force technical school in Denver early in 
1946, Private First Class Reece Bowen reported directly to Eglin. Assigned to the new 
engine shop crew on Santa Rosa Island, the eighteen-year-old technician found himself 
on the cutting edge of American cruise missile technology. Bowen initially assembled 
pulse-jet engines and missile airframes shipped from the storage facility at the 829
th
 
Specialized Sub-Depot in Gadsden, Alabama, where the remaining 700 JB-2s awaited 
assignment. Surprised at the simplicity of the airframe and engine housing, Bowen 
recalled, “Those things was shipped to us in a crate, the missiles were. So we’d just take 
and match bolts and stuff and put them back together. See, there wasn’t much to the 
doggone things.” The crates arrived on the island by barge from the mainland, and 
crewmen assembled the missiles on the docks for transport to storage buildings or one of 
the two launching areas. When test launches began only the “zero launch” fifty-foot 
mobile ramp stood ready, as the 400-foot fixed ramp was not yet complete.
104
 
Accompanying each JB-2 as it rolled on a trailer from the assembly area to the 
launch site, Bowen remained nearby as the crane operator slung the JB-2 onto the launch 
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cart (sitting on the ramp with four RATO boosters attached), completing any mechanical 
adjustments necessary as the engine and airframe were tested and prepared for launch. A 
reinforced concrete bunker twenty-five yards east of the “zero launch” pad sheltered 
airmen directly involved in firing the missile, but Bowen remembers hiding behind a sand 
dune with the rest of the airmen on site.
105
 
 
JB-2 on L-1 “zero launch” ramp, (at 80K248) after crane placement, c.1947.106 
 
In the hundreds of JB-2 launches Bowen participated in, the most common 
problem encountered involved the RATO booster rockets attached to the launch cart, “It 
had four boosters back there, and if one didn’t help get it up to speed it would just die 
there between the launch pad and the ocean out there.” Documented during 
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archaeological work in June 2012, the rusting remains of these missile failures still lie in 
the shifting sands on 8Ok248, and are discussed in further detail in the Appendix.
107
 
As Reece Bowen progressed in rank from Private First Class to Sergeant on Santa 
Rosa Island, his duties within the JB-2 program evolved. During his two years on station 
(1946-1948), Bowen participated in tests designed to determine how many JB-2s could 
be launched during a single day. Timing began at the docks as technicians removed the 
missiles from crates, and ended with the last JB-2 launched from the ramp. Up to thirty 
missiles per day were launched during these trials. Eventually, officers ordered Bowen 
inside the concrete bunker during launches to “push the button.” Despite being directly 
responsible for energizing the solenoid that released the missile, Sergeant Bowen 
remained unimpressed, “I didn’t particularly care. I’d rather have been outside watching 
it take off. You can’t see too much out of that block house. Everybody would rather be 
out there watching than inside.” Bowen enjoyed his next assignment much more, when 
he left the island briefly for temporary duty with a crew launching the JB-2 from B-17 
and B-29 bombers on Eglin Auxiliary Field #1. The sergeant attached a missile onto a 
specially designed rack on the underside of each wing of the bombers, before entering the 
plane as part of the flight crew. Bowen’s job aboard the aircraft included igniting the 
pulse-jet engine and releasing the missile remotely via a small control panel at his station. 
As the bombers could reach over 200 miles per hour at launch altitude, no RATO rockets 
were necessary. Although both the JB-2 tests on Santa Rosa Island and thousands of feet 
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above it supplied valuable data to America’s fledgling cruise missile program, Bowen, 
ever pragmatic, explains, “I liked the deal because we got flight pay out of it.”108 
The blockhouse and launch pad where Reece Bowen served as a young missileer 
on Santa Rosa Island remain, along with deteriorating material remains of JB-2s he 
watched fall short of the Gulf of Mexico onto the white sands in failed launch attempts. 
All of these are part of Florida archaeological site 8Ok248, where the First Experimental 
Guided Missiles Group utilized an L-1 “zero launch” fifty-foot mobile ramp during the 
JB-2 test program. The remnants of this facility, and its sister site one half mile east 
(8Ok246) where the 400-foot fixed ramp once stood, acted as a catalyst for the author’s 
work in these pages, and the archaeological research conducted on Santa Rosa Island thus 
far provides the base from which a cultural resource perspective is examined in the 
Appendix of this essay. Some structures and numerous artifacts remain at these two JB-2 
launch areas on the island.
109
  
Archaeological research, conducted in June 2012, consisted of surface 
documentation only, as unexploded ordnance (UXO) material lies on site. Using the 
Global Positioning System (GPS) the author and field technicians from Prentice Thomas 
& Associates (PTA) first established site boundaries, then recorded location coordinates 
on debris concentrations and identifiable components lying outside concentrations 
(solitary discoveries), as well as on the camera position of each photograph taken. The 
author closely examined each identifiable artifact on both sites, noting that few objects 
remained intact due to the predominantly ferrous (sheet steel) composition of JB-2 
missiles and the extremely dynamic seaside environment (sun, salt, high winds, severe 
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storms) that has accelerated the deterioration of material culture on site. As a part of this 
on-site analysis, the author recorded detailed text notes on each debris concentration with 
particular attention given to identifiable components, assemblies, and structures of 
airframes and engines while PTA staff photographed and sketched these artifacts and 
features. While a PTA remote sensing team performed non-invasive sub-surface research 
(completing an electromagnetic survey of both sites with inconclusive results), the author 
videotaped the sites from multiple perspectives, focusing on each debris concentration, 
with narration as an additional source of both visual and verbal documentation. The 
author identified fifteen debris concentrations consisting of the deteriorating and/or 
damaged remains of JB-2 missiles left on the sites from failed test launches conducted 
between 1947 and 1950, and utilized historic photographs taken at these locations for an 
on-site comparative analysis with the material remains.
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At the conclusion of fieldwork, the author selected twelve artifacts to be 
recovered from the sites for conservation due to the significance of these objects as 
diagnostic design elements of JB-2 construction. The eligibility potential of both 8Ok248 
and 8Ok246 for the National Register, assessed through the archaeological evidence 
obtained through the fieldwork and conveyed by the material culture remaining there, is 
presented in detail in the Appendix.
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Swift Wings Against A Rising Red Tide 
Sergeant Bowen and his crew launched their test missiles into the Gulf of Mexico 
wary of world events foretelling an uneasy future. The upgraded, radio/radar-controlled 
JB-2s showed improvements in range, control precision, and accuracy compared to the 
pre-set, “fire and forget” mechanical missiles as they transformed from relative 
mechanical simplicity to electronic complexity. Designers, under contract for new 
missiles still in the research and development stage, learned from the data being 
generated on Santa Rosa Island and made engineering changes accordingly. Yet, the JB-2 
tests capturing the imagination of both the American public, and the Soviet politburo, 
occurred at sea.  
A Loon (Navy JB-2) fired from a fixed ramp atop the hull of the USS Cusk on 
February 12, 1947, created headlines as the first cruise missile launched from a 
submarine. This pivotal event in the evolution of naval warfare brought sweeping 
changes in both strategy and tactics. The Loon increased the effective heavy 
bombardment range of the Navy, previously limited to twenty-five miles with traditional 
ordnance, to over one hundred miles. If force was necessary as a last resort of 
containment, the U.S. Navy Loon, as the world’s only submarine-launched cruise missile, 
presented a swift, stealthy, and viable option. Even China, where communist forces under 
Mao Zedong would soon defeat the nationalist regime of Chiang Kai-shek, became 
vulnerable to submarines armed with Loons. With radio/radar control, Loon missiles had 
not only greater accuracy, but also the ability to change course in flight if necessary. 
Submarines could now engage the enemy far beyond sea-going vessels and shoreline 
targets. As a portable, submerged missile launch site, such vessels could be brought 
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undetected to within a few miles of a hostile shoreline to engage land targets anywhere 
within the Loon’s one-hundred-mile range. To emphasize this element of surprise, the 
Navy conducted the February 12 launch within full view of hundreds of unsuspecting 
Californians going about their daily routines near Point Mugu. An enthusiastic press 
exclaimed the Navy “has the greatest guided missile in the history of warfare.” Wishing 
to temper exaggerated claims for the Loon while maintaining public zeal for the future of 
submarine-launched cruise missiles, Navy officials explained, “the Loon is admittedly 
outmoded and obsolescent as a missile and serves only as a vehicle for testing missile 
components, radio guidance mechanisms and new theories.” The tactical advantage of 
submarine-launched missiles presented an historic moment the Navy wanted to publicize 
and capitalize upon, an achievement made possible through a reliable, adaptable test 
vehicle. 
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Loon missile launch from USS Cusk, February 12, 1947.
113
 
 
To an audience concerned about communist expansion, the national media re-told 
the story of the submarine Loon launch through June 1947. The story had staying power, 
fed by Navy public relations officers eager to keep their missile milestone fresh in the 
minds of Pentagon planners as the budget for fiscal year 1948 was finalized. The well-
publicized submarine launch exemplified how the U.S. Navy continued its watch with a 
new waterborne weapon to keep the Russian bear at bay. Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, 
in an obvious prediction printed in the Chicago Tribune, suggested submarines might be 
armed with cruise missiles carrying atomic weapons. Scientists at the Naval Air Missile 
Test Center, in step with the Admiral’s remarks and motivated by disturbing events in 
Europe and Asia, explored fitting nuclear warheads to Loon missiles. Historian Elaine 
Tyler May describes how a sense of security in such an insecure world came to the 
American family through protection, “against impending doom by the wonders of 
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modern technology.” The JB-2/Loon stood as one of those “wonders” helping American 
families feel safer in a nuclear world.
114
 
The United States Navy, as the front line of the new American defense policy of 
containment, had taken a keen interest in the JB-2 since the beginning of the program in 
1944. Naval observers remained billeted at the original Range 64 on Eglin Field 
throughout the initial JB-2 test period. Pacific Fleet headquarters developed plans to 
launch the missiles from an American aircraft carrier against Japanese forces in 1945, but 
the initiative ultimately became unnecessary. Eventually obtaining almost four hundred 
JB-2s, the Navy officially re-named the missile the KGW-1 in 1945, changed this 
designation to KUW-1 in 1946, before finally settling on LTV-N-2. The confusing 
nomenclature protocol prompted the much more common use of the informal term 
“Loon” to identify the Navy’s JB-2. The successful February 1947 submarine initiative 
originated from an onshore test program in 1946 at the newly established Naval Air 
Missile Test Center at Point Mugu, California. The same project developed the Navy’s 
experimental guided missile surface vessel, the USS Norton Sound, which launched its 
first missile (a Loon) on January 26, 1948. A second submarine, the USS Carbonero, was 
fitted for cruise missile testing with the Loon, conducting test firings from 1949 to 1950.
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Loon launches ashore at Point Mugu continued concurrently with the submarine and 
surface ship program.
115
 
While the Air Force and Navy enhanced the JB-2/Loon, tensions rose in the 
continuing quid pro quo between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Marshall 
Plan (1948-1952), officially the European Recovery Program initiated by Secretary of 
State George C. Marshall, brought thirteen billion dollars in aid to re-build Europe in a 
direct application of the Truman Doctrine to contain the spread of Communism. Stalin 
responded by tightening his hold on Eastern Europe, most notably with the Berlin 
Blockade (1948-1949), ordering the Red Army to close all routes to non-Soviet areas. 
America, Great Britain, and France countered with a round-the-clock airlift that earned, 
“the respect of most Germans, and a global public relations triumph that made Stalin look 
brutal and incompetent.” The crisis in Berlin fueled the formation of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, wherein member nations of North America and 
Europe agreed to defend one another if attacked. As the US committed itself to the 
peacetime defense of Europe, the USSR exploded its first atomic bomb on August 29 and 
Mao Zedong announced the formation of the People’s Republic of China on October 1. 
Shocked the Soviets obtained “the bomb” so quickly, and shaken by the rise of a 
communist China, Americans also feared “enemies within” as former State Department 
official Alger Hiss, accused as a Soviet spy, faced sentencing for perjury from 
investigations of the House Un-American Activities Committee. Using this “Red Scare” 
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to advance his career, Senator Joseph McCarthy attained national fame on February 9, 
1950 claiming to have a long list of communist party members working in the 
Department of State. In April, top secret report NSC-68 from the Department of Defense 
described US military strength as “dangerously inadequate” and the USSR “developing 
the military capacity to support its design of world domination.” The rapid succession of 
the above events legitimized the need to expand America’s arsenal of democracy, now 
including an operational cruise missile, against the communist threat.
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The USN navigated the troubled waters of this unpredictable world current as the 
Cold War gathered steam from 1948 through 1950, making certain the Loon missile, now 
defined as a test vehicle, stood ready for deployment if needed, while the USAF worked 
concurrently to upgrade its JB-2s. Improvements in accuracy, reliability and control 
responses of the JB-2/Loon progressed steadily, and the capability to air-launch the 
missiles from the B-17 Flying Fortress, B-29 Superfortress, and B-36 Peacemaker (in 
1949) Air Force bombers extended the range of the weapon by thousands of miles. The 
new Strategic Air Command stationed B-29 bombers, capable of launching JB-2s, in 
England throughout the test program (1947-1950). Seeking publicity for the tests on 
Santa Rosa Island, the USAF invited reporters to ride in the nose of a B-29 to observe JB-
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2 air launch operations, and hosted President Truman, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, 
and Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson at a JB-2 ground launch on April 22, 1950.
117
  
 
JB-2 launched from B-29 bomber over Gulf of Mexico, March 17, 1949.
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Recall to Duty 
Two months later, the invasion of South Korea by North Korean troops on June 
25, 1950, proved Moscow’s expansionist intentions to Truman, as the Cold War turned 
hot. Two days after the conflict began, and immediately following the United Nations 
recommendation for member nations to provide military aid to South Korea, President 
Truman announced that, “Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to 
conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war.” Remaining true 
to his policy of containment, Truman immediately mobilized United States military 
forces occupying Japan to repel North Korean forces. The JB-2/Loon missile, though 
considered obsolete and valuable only as a test vehicle a few weeks earlier, transferred 
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back to active duty. The Chief of Naval Operations soon ordered twenty-five Loon 
missiles to be armed with fuses and warheads for possible operational use.
119
 
By Land or By Sea 
By the summer of 1950, the Pentagon began to consider the submarine, with its 
stealth advantage over land ramps (fixed or mobile) and bomber aircraft, as the ultimate 
cruise missile launch platform. A November 1949 Navy exercise, off Hawaii, provided 
convincing evidence. Loon missiles fired from the submarines USS Cusk and USS 
Carbonero managed to escape unharmed through a gauntlet of anti-aircraft fire from 
thirty-five surface vessels, and elude the machine guns of fighter aircraft from carriers 
USS Valley Forge and USS Boxer. The USAF continued its JB-2 tests both from 8Ok246 
and 8Ok248 on Santa Rosa Island, and above it from B-29 and B-36 aircraft through the 
end of June when the war in Korea re-directed Air Force efforts and effectively ended the 
program six weeks later. The new war had the opposite effect on the Navy’s Loon 
program. Along with the directive to arm twenty-five Loon missiles for tactical readiness 
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in August 1950, funding for research and development initiatives of the JB-2/Loon went 
to the Navy for the duration of the Korean conflict.
120
  
Just before the Navy became sole proprietor of America’s first cruise missile, the 
Army considered deploying its own JB-2s in July 1950. Informed by the Air Force of the 
successful testing of the fifty-foot mobile “zero launch” ramp, the Army obtained sixty 
JB-2s as a “suitable interim guided missile for an emergency war or a suitable training 
vehicle.” When Korea provided an emergency war, the Army test program became 
priority for the Army’s 1st Guided Missiles Group at Fort Bliss, an extensive military 
reserve stretching across the Texas-New Mexico state line north of El Paso. Almost as 
quickly as it began, the Army program yielded to the Pentagon’s new direction, leaving 
JB-2/Loon efforts to the Naval Air Missile Test Center.
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In addition to the ground and air launch tests to improve radar tracking and radio 
guidance originating on and above Santa Rosa, fourteen JB-2s became aerial targets 
during the last months of the USAF program. Testing of the new A-10 infrared gunsight 
for fighter aircraft, underway on Eglin, utilized JB-2s launched from B-29 bombers. 
Shortly after the bomber released the missiles, fighter aircraft equipped with the new 
infrared gunsight shot down the JB-2s over the Gulf of Mexico. The last documented JB-
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2 launch at Eglin AFB occurred on August 11, 1950, as an air-launch from a B-29 
bomber participating in the A-10 gunsight project.
122
 
Sailing to Sunset 
The US Navy brought the JB-2/Loon to its full potential in the last years of its use 
as America’s first cruise missile. By 1950, the Pentagon considered the Navy version 
superior to the Air Force model. Technicians at the Naval Air Missile Test Center 
modified the 399 JB-2s received from the USAF with a succession of upgrades, including 
a more reliable radio guidance system, improved radar tracking methods, and better target 
acquisition through the installation of a wing separation device that expended both wings 
from the missile via a small explosive charge initiated by radio control.
123
  
In the most successful transfer of radio guidance control of a missile from ship to 
shore on March 22, 1950, the USS Cusk launched a Loon just off Point Mugu. The Cusk 
guided the missile for twenty-five miles before surrendering radio control to a station on 
San Nicolas Island. Navy technicians on the island guided the missile another twenty-five 
miles to a splashdown in the Pacific just over a thousand feet from the center of the 
target. On May 3, the Cusk set a new distance record for the Loon. Diving to periscope 
depth immediately after the launch, the submarine controlled the missile and tracked its 
position for 105 nautical miles. Loon launches from the Cusk were featured in an episode 
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of Time for Defense (a radio program broadcast nationally on the ABC network), and in 
the May 1950 issue of Popular Science.
124
 
The US Navy pioneered the use of both radar and computer control of guided 
missiles with the Loon between 1950 and 1953. Under Project Trounce, engineers from 
the Naval Electronics Laboratory created a control system designed to replace radio 
guidance by using the radar signal tracking each Loon to transmit control commands to 
the missile. Test launches from Point Mugu under radar control successfully guided 
Loons for up to 93 nautical miles, during which operators transferred control of the 
missiles from the Naval Air Missile Test Center shore station to the USS Cusk, and 
subsequently to the USS Carbonero. Scientists at the test center produced a pivotal 
achievement in modern warfare with the creation of the Marine Guidance Computer 
(MGC), which used the Loon in the first successful missile flights controlled by a 
computer. With position, course, and speed information provided by tracking radar, the 
computer analyzed this data and transmitted course correction commands by radio 
transmission, guiding the missile to the target. As each Loon neared the target area, the 
MGC computed the position where the dive to the target should be initiated and 
transmitted the “dump” command when the missile reached that point.125 
The last Loon missile launch occurred on September 11, 1953, putting an end to a 
nine-year span of JB-2/Loon test programs that advanced cruise missile development 
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from the mechanical era into the computer age, provided essential training to America’s 
first missileers, and brought sweeping changes to both military strategy and battlefield 
tactics. The Navy’s Bureau of Aeronautics, believing that testing of the Loon missile had 
reached the practical limit, summarized its important contributions to United States 
defense initiatives in a report to the Committee on Guided Missiles of the Research and 
Development Board of the National Military Establishment. The narrative reiterates that 
the JB2/Loon provided the only test vehicle available between 1944 and 1953 for the 
successful development of command guidance techniques (including radio, radar, and 
computer control), launching methods, personnel training, and the improvement of 
individual components and entire systems for succeeding missile designs. Emphasizing 
the seminal achievement of a submarine-launched cruise missile, the Navy detailed the, 
“opportunity provided for evaluation of submarine missile launching, handling and 
guidance gear,” and the, “information provided on problems of submarine and shipboard 
missile operations” furnished to the Regulus and Rigel missile programs under 
development. As a cogent reminder of geo-political realities of the time, and the dual role 
of the JB2/Loon as both teacher and, if need be, terminator, the Navy mentioned the Loon 
missiles, “held in readiness for possible operational use as an interim weapon.”126 
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Ironically, seven months earlier in February 1953, the USSR cancelled its first 
cruise missile test program, centered upon Soviet copies of the German V-1. Completely 
unknown to the Americans, the Red Army also captured V-1s near the end of World War 
II. In typical Stalin-era secrecy, the Soviet Air Forces produced hundreds of V-1 clones 
(known as the 10Kh), and began a test launch program in March 1945 that paralleled the 
JB-2/Loon program until early 1953. Crews launched 10Kh missiles from ground ramps 
and aircraft, but the USSR made no effort to launch the missiles from ships or 
submarines. The Kremlin reaped the same benefits from the 10Kh that the Pentagon 
harvested from the JB-2, employing the invaluable technological lessons learned from 
these test vehicles on next generation cruise missiles.
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When the JB-2/Loon retired from military service following the end of the Korean 
War in 1953, the two men ultimately responsible for the missile’s continuing 
development had recently departed the world stage. Harry Truman left office on January 
20, 1953, upon the presidential inauguration of Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Soviet 
premier Joseph Stalin died six weeks later on March 5. Both men had begun, privately, to 
sense the futility of a nuclear war, but subsequent leadership in the US and USSR failed 
to reach this conclusion.
128
  
President Eisenhower asked his advisors to find ways to use strategic, and the 
newly-developed “tactical” nuclear weapons, in Korea to end the conflict. Understanding 
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the many objections to this initiative, Eisenhower stated firmly, “somehow or other the 
tabu which surrounds the use of atomic weapons would have to be destroyed.” Tactical 
nuclear weapons consisted of smaller atomic warheads for use on the battlefield that 
could be delivered via aircraft, artillery, or missile. First developed by the United States 
and deployed in 1952 in gravity bomb form with both Air Force and Navy aircraft, 
tactical nuclear weapons designed for cruise missiles arrived too late for the JB-2/Loon, 
but its successors, the Matador and Regulus, carried them throughout their service life. 
All subsequent cruise missile designs have retained tactical nuclear capability.
129
    
The Cold War continued another forty years, during which, according to historian 
John Lewis Gaddis, “the world spent the last half of the 20th century having its deepest 
anxieties not confirmed.” One of the many legacies of the Cold War, the present-day 
cruise missile, conceived in Nazi vengeance as the V-1 and matured by American fears as 
the JB2/Loon, retains the ability to terrorize, or avenge, in missions unimaginable to its 
creators.
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CONCLUSION 
 
Korea, along with the cruise missile and its progeny, continue to make headlines 
well into the twenty-first century. On February 14, 2013, in response to North Korea’s 
continuing development of long-range ballistic missiles, the South Korean Defense 
Ministry announced the deployment of a cruise missile launched from a ship or 
submarine described as, “a precision-guided weapon that can identify and strike the 
window of the office of North Korea’s leadership.” Three months later on May 22, 
United States Attorney General Eric Holder revealed to Congressional leaders that 
counterterrorism assault drone strikes had killed four Americans overseas. Through the 
fall of 2013, the Obama administration debated whether or not to launch cruise missiles 
against Syria for its use of chemical weapons on its own populace. Neither cruise missiles 
nor assault drones would exist without the technological innovations tested and proven in 
the JB-2/Loon, serving as a “catalyst in rejuvenating a dormant US missile program.”131 
The USAF Matador and USN Regulus cruise missiles, immediate successors to 
the JB-2/Loon, both deployed in 1954, became obsolescent with the development of the 
Navy’s Polaris ballistic missile by 1961. The Polaris, a direct descendant of the German 
V-2, just as the Matador and Regulus were children of the V-1/JB-2/Loon, employed 
solid rocket fuel to power its sub-orbital trajectory. Both the Matador and Regulus 
suffered from the same deficiencies as the JB-2/Loon, a target radius of one mile at best 
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with a limited range (100 miles) and payload. Though targeting accuracy and payload did 
not significantly improve with this first sub-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), Polaris 
offered a much longer range (1,000 miles), and, most importantly for the Navy, the 
ability to launch from a submerged submarine. Both the Loon and Regulus cruise missiles 
required a surface launch, thereby making the submarine vulnerable to attack during 
missile firing operations. Submerged cruise missile launches began in the 1980s.
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USAF Matador cruise missile, c.1954.
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USN Regulus cruise missile, c.1954.
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USN Polaris ballistic missile, c.1961.
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The success of the Polaris effectively shelved further cruise missile development 
in the US Navy for twenty years, but the Air Force persisted in its own programs for both 
cruise and ballistic missiles. The Matador, and its later variant the Mace, remained active 
duty cruise missiles along the Iron Curtain (armed with tactical nuclear warheads) until 
1962 and 1969 respectively, as the Air Force’s first Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 
(ICBMs), the Atlas, Titan, and Minuteman became operational. Still, the need for short 
and intermediate range missiles remained in contingency Cold War plans. Cruise missiles 
including the Snark, Navajo, Hound Dog and others, launched by ground ramp or 
bomber, built upon the strengths of each preceding design through the 1970s. Although 
these weapons contained revolutionary map-matching and inertial guidance systems 
within the missiles’ interiors, eliminating the need for a ground, sea, or airborne control 
station, targeting accuracy did not improve significantly over the radio/radar and external 
computer control systems of the JB-2/Loon programs.
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USAF Atlas ballistic missile, c.1962.
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The increase in acts of terrorism against the United States beginning in the 1970s, 
and the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, led to a change of mission for the American 
military; and, along with concurrent technological progress, sparked a cruise missile 
revival. Washington now faced smaller, elusive enemies not always recognizable by 
uniformed forces, masses of weaponry, or official association with nation-states. The fear 
of potential nuclear war from communist expansionism faded, replaced by the horrifying 
reality of attacks by individual extremists, often motivated by religious zeal or cultural 
exasperation, on American civilians abroad and at home. Unable to prevent all acts of 
terror, the United States targeted countries sponsoring terrorist actions or terrorist groups, 
attacking Libya (1986, 2011), Iraq (1991, 2003-2013), and Afghanistan (2001-?). With 
the perfection of terrain contour map-matching technology, high-speed microcomputers, 
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and miniaturized radar circuitry in the late 1970s, and the advent of the global positioning 
system [GPS] in the 1990s, the accuracy problem of cruise missile targeting dissolved, 
replaced by “surgical strike” capability. The USAF AGM-86 (1980-present) and the USN 
Tomahawk (1983-present) represent the latest generation of cruise missiles (first used in 
battle during the 1991 Gulf War) which have become the weapon of choice to neutralize 
hostile military installations without risk to far more expensive assault drones and 
American military personnel, and reducing danger to non-combatants. Yet the cruise 
missile of the early twenty-first century, for all its technological wonder, lacks the 
psychological consolation its patriarch possessed. The existence of America’s first cruise 
missile, the JB-2/Loon, may have offered some relief to American anxiety rising from the 
“Red Scare” of the early Cold War, but today’s cruise missiles, though effective against 
substantial structural targets, cannot quell the fear of a lone extremist with an improvised 
explosive device (IED) in a crowd of spectators.
138
  
In 2014, the use of drones by the United States military is a subject of profound 
controversy. The most widely known craft among twenty-first century drones (also 
known as unmanned assault vehicles UAV), another line of descendant from the JB-2, is 
the Predator. Initially developed as a remote reconnaissance platform transmitting live 
video by satellite in the 1990s (controlled by a computer whose operator may be half a 
world away), the USAF added an interchangeable weapons system to the Predator in 
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2001, transforming it into an assault drone. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is 
estimated to have killed over 3,000 people with assault drones from 2004 to 2013 in 
Pakistan alone, judged by the Obama administration to be, “people who are on a list of 
active terrorists trying to go in and harm Americans.” The morality and legality of the 
U.S. drone campaign is currently the focus of acrimonious debate.
139
  
 
Predator assault drone firing AGM-114 Hellfire ground attack missile.
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The drone descendants of the JB-2 are not limited to military service, as police 
forces, firefighters, scientists, filmmakers, farmers, real estate agents and numerous other 
operators employ non-lethal designs in an ever-growing list of applications. Private sector 
drone usage is not without controversy, with questions arising over the legal limits of 
surveillance and the rights of personal privacy. The Orwellian presence of “Big Brother” 
evolves with each technological advance.
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So What? 
 This thesis presents an analysis employing the methodology of two disciplines, 
history and historical archaeology, integrated for public presentation. Gathering 
substantial payloads of evidence from both archival research and archaeological 
fieldwork, the essay illuminates the history of the JB-2/Loon and establishes the 
significance of associated surviving material culture on Santa Rosa Island, Florida. 
Fusing the practical applications, and perspectives, of history and archaeology 
(professions working all too frequently in separate domains), allows greater depth and 
complexity in this examination, as well as better informed conclusions. 
The JB-2 is historically significant as the progenitor of all cruise missile and 
drone developments since World War II, and for its roles as a seminal test vehicle for the 
development of cruise missile technology, a weapon ready for use by the United States 
near the end of combat operations against the Japanese in 1945 and, if necessary, 
throughout the early Cold War until 1953, and as an added measure of security to an 
American public fearing a nuclear attack from the Soviet Union. Further significance for 
the “Good Robot Bomb” is rooted in the astonishing irony that the United States eagerly 
embraced what it considered a Nazi terror weapon in the V-1, copying its design and 
technology for planned immediate use on a grand scale. This decision emphasizes how 
the definition of a weapon of terror depends upon which side of the conflict one stands.
142
  
The JB-2/Loon, as America’s only operational cruise missile between 1944 and 
1953, provided the solitary opportunity for new or improved systems of such weaponry to 
be evaluated and for personnel to be trained. Test programs utilizing these missiles 
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included ground, air, sea surface vessel and submarine launches, radio, radar, and 
computer guidance control, terminal dive execution, operations under simulated combat 
conditions in extreme weather, tactics for missile destruction by fighter plane and anti-
aircraft, radar tracking procedures, as well as numerous studies of re-designed 
components in the electrical, pneumatic, fuel, armament, and flight control systems. 
America’s first cruise missile operators, technicians, and engineers honed their craft on 
the JB-2/Loon, and applied these skills in the development and deployment of more 
advanced models.  
The JB-2/Loon exemplifies the technological transition from the mechanical to 
the electronic age in missile technology and military aviation. America’s first cruise 
missile represented the end of simplicity in design for such weaponry, where operators 
with a low technical skill set could affect necessary repairs and field modifications 
through grease monkey know-how and farm boy intuition, and the beginning of a new 
paradigm where numerous sub-specialists of complex systems filled the growing 
missileer ranks. Engineers applying numerous innovations driven by Cold War realities 
resulted in a submarine-launched, computer-controlled Loon of 1953 far removed from 
the V-1 copies of Range 64 and Sergeant Reece Bowen’s “fire and forget” procedures on 
the sands of Santa Rosa.  
Alongside America’s demonstrated nuclear capability, the JB-2/Loon developed 
in support of the Truman administration’s policy of containment within the “arsenal of 
democracy” used in the growing East-West arms race to intimidate the Soviet Union 
from further geo-political expansion, thereby temporarily calming some of the fears for 
Americans preparing to “duck and cover” or considering a backyard bomb shelter. 
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Historian Stephen J. Whitfield asserts, “Vigilance against Communism was a national 
priority during the darkest days of the Cold War, from the late 1940s until the mid-
1950s.” However vigilant the Pentagon may have been, the threat of American military 
technology did not prevent North Korea, upon the blessing of Stalin, from attacking 
South Korea in an effort to extend Communism throughout the peninsula. The Navy 
prepared Loon missiles for deployment to Korea in 1950, and President Eisenhower 
repeatedly pushed for the use of atomic weapons there in 1953, but neither was utilized in 
the conflict.
143
 
Why is this stuff important? 
The cultural remains of the two JB-2 launch sites on Santa Rosa Island must be 
understood within the context of the early Cold War period in which they existed. The 
JB-2 represented, essentially, German technology employed as an implied threat against 
Soviet expansion by an American government motivated as much by anxiety as by 
political philosophy. Archaeological sites 8Ok246 and 8Ok248, described and evaluated 
in the Appendix, are the physical remnants of one defense initiative the United States 
used in the effort to deter nefarious communist intentions. Thus, the JB-2 stood ready as a 
contingency weapon that could be made available for rapid deployment, while it pursued 
its primary mission as a template for improving cruise missile technology. Each of these 
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roles is apparent in the structural remains from the late 1940s test programs on Santa 
Rosa Island. A four-hundred-foot ramp of concrete and steel, though helpful for test 
launches, would not be a viable option for immediate hostilities; whereas a fifty-foot 
launch ramp on a highly mobile trailer system could be ideal for battlefield deployment.  
Derelict JB-2 missile sites exist in Utah and New Mexico in addition to Florida. 
Earthen launch ramps, though incomplete, remain at Wendover AFB (Utah) and 
Holloman AFB (NM) along with adjacent related structures. Preservation efforts are 
underway at both sites in the American Southwest. Research for this essay proved unable 
to determine whether or not there are any structural remains, save for a lone Loon on 
display atop a pedestal, extant from the test program at the former Naval Air Missile Test 
Center in Point Mugu, California (re-named Naval Base Ventura County in 2000). All 
sea-going vessels involved in launching Loon missiles no longer exist, having been 
scrapped (USS Cusk in 1972 and USS Norton Sound in 1988) or sunk as a target (USS 
Carbonero, 1975). In addition to the sites on Santa Rosa Island, Eglin AFB has the 
remains of a steel JB-2 launch ramp at Auxiliary Field #1 (Wagner Field). Historical and 
archaeological investigations on Eglin failed to determine precisely how the Wagner 
Field ramp was used. Far more JB-2 missiles were fired from the ramps on, and bombers 
above, Santa Rosa Island than those expended at Wendover and Holloman AFBs, or 
Loons launched by the US Navy.
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The material culture on archaeological sites 8Ok246 and 8Ok248, consisting of 
JB-2 missile remnants and related launch facilities, are significant because, according to 
the National Register Guidelines for Evaluating and Documenting Historic Aviation 
Properties, they, “have yielded, and are likely to continue to yield, information important 
in history.” These guidelines specifically state that “aviation wrecks and ruins of aviation 
facilities” may qualify for National Register listing. The historical context of the JB-2 
sites on Santa Rosa Island, examined in Chapter II, includes the Cold War and military 
aviation.  Both sites retain “physical characteristics of an aircraft that provide information 
about the craft’s construction, use or operation” that the National Register requires in 
determining importance “within an appropriate historic or archaeological context.” 
Though documentation of the JB-2 has survived, it is incomplete. The cultural landscape 
composing the two early cruise missile sites on Santa Rosa, reviewed in the Appendix, 
replace some of the missing pages in the historical record. Lastly, the National Register 
requires that archaeological sites eligible for listing contain adequate data and 
demonstrate the connection between the specific property and the information it 
possesses. Both JB-2 sites include abundant data, held within some structurally complete 
(and some partially complete) launch facilities, fifteen deteriorating missiles, and 
hundreds of small associated artifacts scattered upon the sands which, by virtue of their 
existence in situ, directly connect the properties to the information thereon.
145
  
Those uninterested in the technical requirements of the National Register will, 
understandably, ask what possible relevance the rusting remnants of missiles and 
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launching facilities on a Florida barrier island have to their lives. The answer lies in what 
these sites represent; a time when a global conflict, very likely involving nuclear 
weapons, was a tangible possibility. The Cold War affected every American family that 
lived through it, and the generation that followed. Perhaps an awareness of the Cold War, 
realized or enhanced through its military remains, may help cultures avoid living through 
such a tenuous time in the future. Writing about his present-day Yale undergraduate 
students, historian John Lewis Gaddis adroitly observes, “Some of them---by no means 
all---understand that if a few decisions had been made differently at a few critical 
moments during that conflict, they might not even have had a life.”146  
The Santa Rosa Island JB-2 sites are important as cultural landscapes, specifically 
military landscapes, created from the value Americans place upon societal preservation 
and new technologies for such protection. These geographic areas represent large 
examples of material culture, defined by historical archaeologist James Deetz as, “That 
portion of man’s physical environment purposely transformed by him according to 
culturally dictated plans.” The American cultural need for national defense motivated the 
plans and execution of modifications on Santa Rosa Island. 8OK248 and 8OK246 are 
microcosms of the vast expanses of the United States (military landscapes) removed from 
public access and dedicated to testing the strategies and tactics of armed forces. Most of 
these landscapes originated during World War II and the Cold War, as did the JB-2 sites. 
The cultural meaning of these two missile sites is that they are evocative of an American 
culture that valued self-preservation through technological advances, and the use of 
deadly force to achieve it, within a belief system that championed democracy and feared 
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the spread of communism. With the exception of a greatly reduced fear of the spread of 
communism, recently replaced by a fear of terrorism, those values remain steadfast 
within American culture.
147
 
Who cares? 
Cultures care about leftover objects from our past because they tell us who we 
are. The relationship to, and perception of, things depends upon the culture to which we 
belong. As noted American material culture historian Thomas J. Schlereth reasons,  
“objects made or modified by humans, consciously or unconsciously, directly or 
indirectly, reflect the belief patterns of individuals who made, commissioned, purchased, 
or used them, and, by extension, the belief patterns of the larger society of which they are 
a part.” The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) directly expressed the perceived importance of historic material culture by 
stating, “cultural property is a basic element of people’s identity and ‘being depends on 
having.’” The material culture of 8Ok246 and 8Ok248 reminds Americans that we, as a 
society, are often motivated by fear, that we are willing to kill in order to defend 
ourselves, and our lifeways, and that we receive some consolation in the existence of 
such weaponry for this purpose like every other human culture since prehistory. Beyond 
these basic human survivalist needs, the JB-2 sites on Santa Rosa Island exemplify the 
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beliefs, anxieties, technological advances, and socio-political climate of the early Cold 
War era in the United States.
148
 
Both 8Ok246 and 8Ok248 became a part of the National Register of Historic 
Places in 1996 under criteria A (for association with events important to American 
military history), C (as unique and distinctive structural remains), and D (for the ability to 
yield information important to American cruise missile development). As discussed in the 
preceding chapters, the research in the nomination expounded on the sites’ significance 
during World War II, which, unfortunately, is an association not possible. Both 8Ok246 
and 8Ok248 are post-war, constructed in 1946-47 and used until 1950. The sites’ 
significance, argued above, and below in the Appendix, is their association with the early 
Cold War. The individuals preparing the nomination for the JB-2 sites on Santa Rosa 
Island confused them with the World War II JB-2 site twenty-two miles east at Four Mile 
Village, Florida, (Coffeen Nature Preserve) in operation from 1944 to1945. Through this 
thesis, the author hopes to correct the history provided to the National Register so that 
these sites may be listed for their proper historical significance and association. Prentice 
Thomas and Associates (PTA) presented recommendations for both active and passive 
preservation initiatives for 8Ok246 and 8Ok248, but their existence on Eglin AFB in an 
active training area utilized by ongoing missile and drone tests, as well as by Special 
Forces of the United States Army and Navy has presented a number of obstacles to 
implementation.
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Although the preservation of these sites, in their entirety, is rife with bureaucratic 
and environmental challenges, one of PTA’s initiatives has been carried out. A small 
portion of the material culture from both launch locations is in the first stages of 
conservation. As a part of the author’s archaeological consulting work on 8Ok246 and 
8Ok248, PTA technicians (working for Eglin AFB), retrieved surface artifacts diagnostic 
to the JB-2 missile that, due to their condition, presented the best chance for long-term 
preservation and public interpretation. Working directly with PTA archaeologists in June 
2012, the author identified and recovered twelve artifacts from these sites for protection, 
including a pulse-jet engine grid, elevator, nose cone, and impeller/air log. These artifacts 
are currently undergoing careful cleaning and conservation efforts in the laboratory 
facilities of PTA at Fort Walton Beach, Florida for eventual public exhibition.
150
  
The JB-2, conceived as Hitler’s first weapon of vengeance (V-1), reproduced by 
America’s unequalled wartime industry, and arriving too late for use by United States 
forces in World War II, became the “mother of all cruise missiles” in its Cold War testing 
role while maintaining implied vigilance in support of communist containment, thereby 
earning historic significance. Combining traditional historical research, the template for 
preservation provided by the National Register of Historic Places (applied in the 
Appendix below), and archaeological fieldwork, this essay explores the operational life 
and legacy of this first generation unmanned assault vehicle, and the global climate in 
which it flew. Such multi-disciplinary approaches are essential, particularly for subjects 
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relatively unknown and incompletely documented, to provide a better understanding of 
our shared cultural experience.  
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APPENDIX: NATIONAL REGISTER ELIGIBILITY ASSESSMENTS 
 
JB-2 Missile Test Site (8Ok248) Santa Rosa Island, Okaloosa County, Florida 
Archaeological site 8Ok248 should be recommended as eligible for the National 
Register under Criterion D, as it meets the age requirement of being over fifty years old, 
and its archaeological remains have yielded, and are likely to continue to yield, 
information important in history. Archaeological sites may qualify under Criterion D, 
according to the National Register, if they: 
1) Demonstrate the “importance of the information within an appropriate historic or 
archaeological context.”151 
 
2) Demonstrate “the connection between the important information and the specific 
property.”152 
 
3) Contain “the presence of adequate data in the property.”153 
 
JB-2 being prepared for launch at 80K248, c.1947.
154
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The National Register defines a property with information as, “a geographic location 
having important historical or archaeological information. The information may be 
literally buried under ground, submerged under water, or scattered across the surface.”155 
Specific direction regarding the eligibility of aviation properties under Criterion D is 
provided by the National Register in its Guidelines for Evaluating and Documenting 
Historic Aviation Properties which states: 
An aviation property is significant under Criterion D if that property has 
yielded, or is likely to yield information important to history, such as the 
physical characteristics of an aircraft that provide information about the 
craft’s construction, use or operation. Aviation wrecks and ruins of 
aviation facilities might qualify for listing in the National Register under 
Criterion D. Also, rare aircraft for which inadequate or no documentation 
has survived might also be considered.
156
 
 
8Ok248 consists of an area on Santa Rosa Island between the main road and the 
Gulf shoreline constructed in 1946-1947 dedicated to testing JB-2 cruise missiles. The 
site continued as a test launch area for the JB-2 until 1950. Material remains on site 
dating from this era include: a paved access road, reinforced concrete launching pad, 
reinforced concrete blockhouse/bunker, and numerous fragmented wrecks of JB-2 
missiles scattered on the surface between the launch pad and the shoreline. See page 76 
above for contemporary satellite imagery maps of 8Ok248.
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Blockhouse/Bunker on 8Ok248, June 2012.
158
 
 
Applying each of the above National Register requirements to 8Ok248, with 
italics added for emphasis, leads to the following conclusions:  
Demonstrating the importance of the information within an appropriate historic or 
archaeological context. 
 
The historical context of 8Ok248, discussed in detail in Chapter II, includes the 
Cold War and military aviation.
159
 The important information within the material remains 
includes, “physical characteristics of an aircraft that provide information about the 
craft’s construction, use or operation” conveyed through fifteen deteriorating JB-2 
airframes and engines lying on the surface.  The decomposing missiles exhibit prominent 
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design features of the JB-2, including wings, fuselages that include fuel tanks, warheads, 
control housings, and launch cart attach points, empennages that retain elevators and 
rudders, nose cones, and complete engine assemblies. Each of these characteristics speaks 
directly to the aircraft’s construction and use. The existence of warheads inside some of 
the airframes, filled with sand and gravel as “dummy” payloads, demonstrates how 
launch personnel improvised beyond the published JB-2 operations manual to achieve 
proper weight and balance in each missile when airmen removed the amatol explosive (a 
mixture of TNT and ammonium nitrate) prior to flight.  This field modification 
illuminates an undocumented process in the aircraft’s operation. Further, the JB-2 is a 
“rare aircraft” as only twelve intact examples remain of the 1,382 manufactured. The 
surviving complete JB-2s are in environments more conducive to their preservation, but 
each received alteration from its original appearance and configuration through parts 
salvage, restoration, or rehabilitation efforts. However, the missiles on 8Ok248, though 
incomplete with extensive deterioration, appear to have remained untouched by human 
effort since their date of usage. The existence of these spent missiles in situ enhances 
understanding the context of the site as a testing ground, whereas unused, intact missiles 
on exhibition cannot demonstrate this information having been removed from their 
context. Documentation of the JB-2 survives, but it may be considered “inadequate” 
without the surviving, unmodified examples 8Ok248 contains.
160
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 U.S. Department of the Interior, Guidelines for Evaluating and Documenting Historic Aviation 
Properties, 30; Quigg, “Assessment of Significance,” 1-29. Among the twelve complete JB-2/Loons 
existing are examples on exhibition in the National Air and Space Museum’s annex, the Stephen F. Udvar-
Hazy Center at Washington Dulles International Airport in the vicinity of Chantilly, Virginia, the National 
Museum of the United States Air Force adjacent to Wright-Patterson AFB near Dayton, Ohio, the United 
States Air Force Armament Museum adjacent to Eglin AFB near Fort Walton Beach, Florida, and an 
example on a pedestal mount outside the Putnam County Courthouse in Greencastle, Indiana misidentified 
as a V-1 within its interpretive signage. The author has studied and photographed each of these. 
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JB-2 wrecks on 8Ok248, June 2012.
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Demonstrating the connection between the important information and the specific 
property. 
 
All of the important information remains in situ on 8Ok248 within the missile 
wreckage scattered on the surface, as well as in the extant launch pad and 
blockhouse/bunker. Understanding that, “Aviation wrecks and ruins of aviation facilities 
might qualify for listing in the National Register,” this site, containing missile launch 
facilities and the remains of actual missiles launched, has notable potential for eligibility. 
With the blockhouse/bunker where each test initiated maintaining its structural integrity, 
and the launch pad remaining intact, one might argue for eligibility under Criterion A 
(association with an event that made a significant contribution to the broad patterns of our 
history) or Criterion C (embodiment of the distinctive characteristics of type, period, or 
method of construction). However, as all the control panels and furnishings within the 
interior of the blockhouse/bunker have been removed, and the launch pad itself is barren 
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 Quigg, “Assessment of Significance,” 1. 
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concrete, these structures alone cannot convey their significance without the association 
of the JB-2 missiles lying nearby. The site must be considered, in its entirety, for 
eligibility under Criterion D.
162
  
Containing the presence of adequate data in the property. 
With structurally complete launch facilities (blockhouse/bunker and launch pad), 
fifteen deteriorating JB-2 airframes and engines, and hundreds of small associated 
artifacts scattered on the surface throughout the site, 8Ok248 retains more than adequate 
data. Information from the site is already in use, helping to guide Eglin AFB personnel in 
the management of this cultural resource.
163
 
Site 8Ok248 is significant for its association with the early Cold War period, 
conveyed through its cultural remains that present information about the JB-2 project 
(including structural fabrication and operational execution) that cannot be conveyed by a 
published history or conserved missile on display. The JB-2 existed as a contingency 
weapon for containment that could be rapidly deployed, while it fulfilled its principal 
duty as a test aircraft for developing cruise missile technology. These roles are both 
evident in the material culture on Santa Rosa Island.
164
 
                                                          
162 Quigg, “Assessment of Significance,” 1-29; U.S. Department of the Interior, Guidelines for Evaluating 
and Documenting Historic Aviation Properties, 27-28, 30. 
163 Quigg, “Assessment of Significance,” 1-29. 
164 U.S. Department of the Interior, National Register Bulletin 15: How to Apply the National Register 
Criteria for Evaluation, 44-49; Quigg, “Assessment of Significance,” 1-29. The ability of a property to 
convey its significance is known as “integrity” according to the National Register, which requires a 
resource to have retained “several, and usually most,” of the following seven aspects to possess integrity: 
location, design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling and association (context). As detailed above, 
8OK248 has retained each of these seven aspects to a varying degree, most strongly location, design, 
setting, materials, and association.  
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JB-2 departing 80K248, note blockhouse/bunker and launch pad.
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Ironically, 8Ok248 is already on the register; listed, unfortunately, for 
significance it does not possess or convey. In a case of mistaken identity all too common 
within the realm of historic preservation, researchers asserted the Air Force tested JB-2s 
on the Santa Rosa Island sites during World War II. When, in truth, the airmen of Range 
64 at Four Mile Village operated the only JB-2 site active in Florida from 1944-1945. 
The Air Force constructed the sites on Santa Rosa Island (twenty-two miles away) after 
the war, in 1946-47, and used them until 1950. On April 19, 1996, the Florida State 
Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO) and Keeper of the National Register (unaware of 
the inaccurate history in the nomination forms) approved the nomination of 8Ok248 and 
8Ok246 for their association with World War II (when they did not exist), rather than for 
the Cold War association argued in this essay.
166
  
 
                                                          
165 Unnumbered Photograph USAAF, Photograph Collection, Office of History, EAFB. 
166 Thomas, et al., “Investigations at the JB-2 Sites,” 202-204; Quigg, Assessment of Significance,” 1-29. It 
is the author’s intent to present this thesis, and any additional materials required, to the Florida SHPO and 
the Keeper of the National Register in hopes this unfortunate situation may be amended. Such a mistake in 
the research for the nomination is understandable, but also preventable through due diligence. 
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JB-2 Missile Test Site (8Ok246) Santa Rosa Island, Okaloosa County, Florida 
Constructed in 1947, operations at what is now Florida archaeological site 
8Ok246 continued until 1950, where JB-2 missiles flew from a 400-foot inclined ramp 
pointed south to direct the pilotless aircraft over the Gulf of Mexico. At the time the 
author conducted the 2012 field investigations, remains associated with missile activity 
included an asphalt access road (completely buried by wind-blown sand) leading south 
from the singular paved road that bisects the island running east-west, a reinforced 
concrete bunker where operators controlled missile launches, a reinforced concrete pad 
where airmen loaded missiles onto the launch ramp, one solid reinforced concrete pier, 
thirteen H-frame reinforced concrete piers, two sections of steel T-rails (used on the ramp 
to guide missile launch carts), and numerous small debris scatters along with isolated 
artifacts. The remains of one JB-2, completely reduced to a mass of ferrous flakes with 
no structural integrity, lies on the surface at the southernmost pier. All reinforced 
concrete piers have settled to various depths and angles due to the shifting sands of the 
last six decades. Only a few steel connector plates remain from the 400-foot steel truss 
superstructure supported by the piers. A salvage contractor removed the steel in 1958.
167
 
                                                          
167 “Group History: 1st Experimental Guided Missiles Group 1 July 47 Thru 31 Dec 47,” 799-800, 810, 
937-940, 1311, 1370, Office of History, EAFB; Quigg, “Assessment of Significance,” 1-29; “Estimate of 
Cost of Proposed Additional Construction Based on Preliminary Layout Plan EGL 3101 Dated 19 October 
1945, Project: Santa Rosa Island,” RG 218, Entry 343A, Box 4, File, “JB-2 1945,” NARA II; Quigg, 
“Assessment of Significance,” 1-29. My fieldwork, conducted from June 11 through June 15, 2012, and 
detailed in the report cited here, is the source of my site descriptions and eligibility assessments in this 
essay. 
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400-foot launch ramp at 80K246, c.1948
168
 
 
 
Concrete piers from 400-foot launch ramp at 8Ok246, June 2012.
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The archaeological research conducted by the author on Santa Rosa Island 
provides the base from which to present a cultural resource perspective of 8Ok246 below. 
Archaeological research consisted of surface documentation due to unexploded ordinance 
(UXO) remaining on site. A non-invasive, sub-surface electromagnetic survey of both 
                                                          
168 Unnumbered Photograph USAAF, Photograph Collection, Office of History, EAFB.  
169 Photograph by Gary F. Quigg, June 15, 2012. 
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sites provided inconclusive results. The following is an assessment of the eligibility 
potential of 8Ok246.
170
  
Florida archaeological site 8Ok246 on Santa Rosa Island should be recommended 
eligible for the National Register under Criterion D, as it meets the age requirement of 
being over fifty years old, and its archaeological remains have yielded, and are likely to 
continue to yield, information important in history. Archaeological sites may qualify 
under Criterion D, according to the National Register, if they: 
1) Demonstrate the “importance of the information within an appropriate historic or 
archaeological context.”171 
 
2) Demonstrate “the connection between the important information and the specific 
property.”172 
 
3) Contain “the presence of adequate data in the property.”173 
The National Register defines a property with information as, “a geographic location 
having important historical or archaeological information. The information may be 
literally buried under ground, submerged under water, or scattered across the surface.”174 
Specific direction regarding the eligibility of aviation properties under Criterion D is 
provided by the NR in its Guidelines for Evaluating and Documenting Historic Aviation 
Properties which states: 
An aviation property is significant under Criterion D if that property has 
yielded, or is likely to yield information important to history, such as the 
physical characteristics of an aircraft that provide information about the 
craft’s construction, use or operation. Aviation wrecks and ruins of 
aviation facilities might qualify for listing in the National Register under 
                                                          
170 Quigg, “Assessment of Significance,” 1-29. 
171
 U.S. Department of the Interior, Guidelines for Evaluating and Documenting Historic Aviation 
Properties, 30. 
172
 Ibid. 
173
 Ibid. 
174
 Ibid.  
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Criterion D. Also, rare aircraft for which inadequate or no documentation 
has survived might also be considered.
175
 
 
8Ok246 consists of an area on Santa Rosa Island between the main road and the 
Gulf shoreline dedicated to, and constructed for, testing JB-2 cruise missiles in 1947. The 
site continued as a test launch area for the JB-2 until 1950. Material remains on site 
dating from this era include: a paved access road, reinforced concrete missile loading 
pad, reinforced concrete blockhouse/bunker, fourteen concrete piers used as a foundation 
for the steel-truss launch ramp, sections of steel T-rails (used on the ramp to guide launch 
carts), and the fragmented wreckage of a single JB-2 missile scattered on the surface at 
the south end of the ramp area. See page 77 above for contemporary satellite imagery 
maps of 8Ok246.
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Crushed nose cone and broken impeller/air log from JB-2 on 8Ok246, June 2012.
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 Ibid. 
176 “Group History: 1st Experimental Guided Missiles Group 1 July 47 Thru 31 Dec 47,” 799-800, 810, 
937-940, 1311, 1370, Office of History, EAFB; “Estimate of Cost of Proposed Additional Construction 
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Entry 343A, Box 4, File “JB-2 1945,” NARA II; Quigg, “Assessment of Significance,” 1-29. 
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Applying each of the above NR requirements to 8Ok246, with italics added for emphasis, 
leads to the following conclusions: 
Demonstrating the importance of the information within an appropriate historic or 
archaeological context. 
 
The historical context of 8Ok246, discussed in detail above, includes the Cold 
War and military aviation.
178
 The important information within the material remains 
includes, “Aviation wrecks and ruins of aviation facilities” conveyed through the 
structural remains of the 400 foot launch ramp and its related structures. These remnants 
are one-of-a-kind, as they are the only examples extant from a JB-2 launch ramp 
constructed with a large concrete pier foundation. Five additional JB-2 ramp structures 
remain extant, all of which are earthen structures (two at the former site of Range 64 in 
Florida, and one each at Wendover AFB, Utah, and Holloman AFB, New Mexico) except 
a small steel ramp at Eglin AFB Auxiliary Field #1. The lone missile wreck on 8Ok246, 
though without structural integrity, remains evocative of the aircraft’s construction, use 
and operation. Further, the JB-2 is a “rare aircraft” as only twelve intact examples of the 
1,382 manufactured remain. The surviving complete JB-2s are in environments more
                                                          
178 U.S Department of the Interior, How to Complete the National Register Multiple Property Nomination 
Form, 11. The National Register defines historic context as, “those patterns or trends in history by which a 
specific occurrence, property, or site is understood and its meaning (and ultimately its significance) within 
pre-history or history is made clear.” 
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conducive to their preservation, but each has been modified from its original appearance 
and configuration through restoration or rehabilitation efforts.
179
 
Demonstrating the connection between the important information and the specific 
property. 
 
All of the important information remains in situ on 8Ok246 within the structural 
remains. Understanding that, “Aviation wrecks and ruins of aviation facilities might 
qualify for listing in the National Register,” this site, containing missile launch facilities 
and the remains of one of the actual missiles launched, has notable potential for 
eligibility. As the blockhouse/bunker, concrete loading pad, ramp foundation piers, and 
access road all maintain structural integrity, one could argue for eligibility under 
Criterion A (association with an event that made a significant contribution to the broad 
patterns of our history) or Criterion C (embodiment of the distinctive characteristics of 
type, period, or method of construction). However, as all the control panels and 
furnishings within the interior of the blockhouse/bunker have been removed, the loading 
pad itself is barren concrete, the steel-truss ramp has been removed from its piers, and the 
road is indistinguishable as a missile site access, these structures, along with the solitary 
JB-2 missile remains lying nearby, cannot convey the degree of significance required 
                                                          
179 U.S. Department of the Interior, Guidelines for Evaluating and Documenting Historic Aviation 
Properties, 30; Quigg, “Assessment of Significance,” 1-29; “Estimate of Cost of Proposed Additional 
Construction Based on Preliminary Layout Plan EGL 3101 Dated 19 October 1945, Project: Santa Rosa 
Island,” RG 218, Entry 343A, Box 4, File “JB-2 1945,” NARA II; Mindling and Bolton, U.S. Air Force 
Tactical Missiles, 33; Page, “Holloman’s First Test Track,” http://www.alamopulse.com/2262/hollomans-
first-test-track/; “Willys-Overland Now Turning Out U.S. ‘Buzz Bomb’,” File “JB-2/Loon,” Archives, 
NASM; “Willys-Overland Motors, Inc.—World War II Production Record 1941 through 1945,” File “JB-
2,” Archives, WPAFB.; “Progress Report of AAF Pilotless Aircraft as Guided Missiles Development 
Status and Availability,” RG 218, Entry 343A, Box 4, File “JB-2 1946,” NARA II.  
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under Criteria A or C. The site must be considered, in its entirety, for eligibility under 
Criterion D.
180
  
Containing the presence of adequate data in the property. 
With a number of launch facility structures retaining a high level of structural 
integrity (blockhouse/bunker, loading pad, ramp piers and access road), one deteriorated 
JB-2 airframe, and hundreds of small associated artifacts scattered on the surface 
throughout the site, 8Ok246 retains more than adequate data. Information from the site is 
already in use, helping to guide Eglin AFB personnel in the management of this cultural 
resource.
181
 
 
Blockhouse/Bunker on 8Ok246, June 2012.
182
 
 
Site 8Ok246 is significant for its association with the early Cold War period, and 
conveys this significance through its cultural remains; offering information on the JB-2 
                                                          
180 Quigg, “Assessment of Significance,” 1-29; U.S. Department of the Interior, Guidelines for Evaluating 
and Documenting Historic Aviation Properties, 27-28, 30. 
181 Quigg, “Assessment of Significance,” 1-29. 
182 Photograph by Gary F. Quigg, June 15, 2012. 
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project (including structural fabrication and operational execution) a written history or 
preserved missile on exhibition cannot. The JB-2 stood ready as a contingency weapon 
for containment that could be made available for rapid deployment, while it pursued its 
primary mission as a test vehicle for improving cruise missile technology. Each of these 
roles is apparent in the material culture on Santa Rosa Island.
183
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
183 U.S. Department of the Interior, National Register Bulletin 15: How to Apply the National Register 
Criteria for Evaluation, 44-49. The ability of a property to convey its significance is known as “integrity” 
according to the National Register, which requires a resource to have retained “several, and usually most,” 
of the following seven aspects to possess integrity: location, design, setting, materials, workmanship, 
feeling and association (context). As detailed above, 8OK246 has retained each of these seven aspects to a 
varying degree, most strongly location, design, setting, materials, and association. 
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“Deep Rock Tunnel Connector Project – CSO 118 Location, City of Indianapolis, 
Indiana” 
Weintraut & Associates---Zionsville, Indiana (January 2010) 
 
“Mt. Auburn Cemetery, Mt. Auburn Church, Johnson County, Indiana” 
Weintraut & Associates---Zionsville, Indiana (January 2010) 
 
“Adams Center Road Corridor Project, Allen County, Indiana” 
Weintraut & Associates---Zionsville, Indiana (November 2009) 
 
“Bass Road Reconstruction, Allen County, Indiana” 
Weintraut & Associates---Zionsville, Indiana (November 2009) 
 
Television Documentaries/Series: 
 
Indy in the 60s (2011) Writer, Producer [WFYI Indianapolis, Historical]* 
 
Indiana Expeditions (2010) Writer, Producer [WFYI Indianapolis, Science] 
 
Fly Like the Wind (2006) Writer, Director, Producer [WFYI Indianapolis, Historical] 
 
Adams Mill Valley (2005) Writer, Director, Producer [WFYI Indianapolis, Historical] 
 
Harvesting the Past (2002) Executive Producer [WFYI Indianapolis, Historical]** 
 
Adams Mill Valley (2002) Writer, Photographer, Producer [Site Orientation]**/*** 
 
  
Montgomery County: A Special Place (2001) Writer, Producer [Promotional] 
 
Lew Wallace: Study of An American Hero (2000) Writer, Producer [Site Orientation]** 
 
24 Hours at Indy (1999) Trackside Producer [Nineteenth Star, Worldwide Broadcast] 
 
Blessed Mother Theodore (1999) Writer [Nineteenth Star, Commemorative]** 
 
Sugar Creek (1997) Writer, Photographer, Director, Producer [Environmental/Historical] 
 
The Old Normal (1995) Writer, Producer [Preservation Advocacy/Historical] 
 
*Emmy Award from the National Academy of Television Arts and Sciences 
**Telly Award Winner from the National Center for Creativity 
***Honorable Mention from the Windsong International Film Festival 
